Flare-ON 9th 之第八题BackDoor
2022-11-16 15:26:5 Author: bbs.pediy.com(查看原文) 阅读量:18 收藏

让我们简单先分析下混淆的原理,根据原理来完成去混淆,通过分析,有大部分函数是通过触发异常来完成解密方法体的调用的,如下所示:
图片描述
flare_71方法使用DynamicMethod根据传入的字节码数组来进行动态调用:
图片描述
这类受保护的方法还有一个很明显的特征就是开头是两个NOP,而且调用了flare_71,知道这些后就可以编写代码还原第一层混淆:
图片描述
代码如下所示,自动寻找符合特征的函数,调用目标exe里面的相关方法并修复exe。

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private static void flareon_wrap_decrypt(IList<TypeDef> typeDefs)

 {

     foreach (var typeDef in typeDefs)

         foreach (var methodDef in typeDef.Methods)

             if (methodDef.Module.Name == Assembly.ManifestModule.ScopeName && methodDef.HasBody &&

                 methodDef.Body.Instructions.Count > 2 && methodDef.Body.Instructions[0].OpCode == OpCodes.Nop &&

                 methodDef.Body.Instructions[1].OpCode == OpCodes.Nop)

             {

                 var is_wrap = false;

                 var find_true_call = false;

                 MethodDef true_call_MethodDef = null;

                 var is_get_all_args = false;

                 var args_token = new int[2];

                 var Instructions = methodDef.Body.Instructions;

                 for (var i = 0; i < Instructions.Count; i++)

                 {

                     if (!find_true_call && Instructions[i].OpCode == OpCodes.Call)

                     {

                         find_true_call = true;

                         true_call_MethodDef = (MethodDef)Instructions[i].Operand;

                     }

                     if (Instructions[i].OpCode == OpCodes.Ldsfld && Instructions[i + 1].OpCode == OpCodes.Ldsfld)

                     {

                         args_token[0] = ((FieldDef)Instructions[i].Operand).MDToken.ToInt32();

                         args_token[1] = ((FieldDef)Instructions[i + 1].Operand).MDToken.ToInt32();

                         Console.WriteLine("---------------------");

                         Console.WriteLine(Instructions[i].Operand.ToString());

                         Console.WriteLine(Instructions[i + 1].Operand.ToString());

                         Console.WriteLine("---------------------");

                         is_get_all_args = true;

                     }

                     if (Instructions[i].OpCode == OpCodes.Call && Instructions[i].Operand.ToString().Contains("flare_71") && is_get_all_args)

                     {

                         is_wrap = true;

                     }

                 }

                 if (is_wrap && find_true_call)

                 {

                     CurrentMethod = methodDef;

                     var fieldInfo0 = Assembly.Modules.FirstOrDefault().ResolveField(args_token[0]);

                     var fieldInfo1 = Assembly.Modules.FirstOrDefault().ResolveField(args_token[1]);

                     var arg0 = (Dictionary<uint, int>)fieldInfo0.GetValue(null);

                     var arg1 = (byte[])fieldInfo1.GetValue(null);

                     Console.WriteLine(methodDef.FullName);

                     var dm = flare.flare_71(Assembly.Modules.FirstOrDefault(), true_call_MethodDef.MDToken.ToInt32(), arg0, arg1);

                     var methodBody = MethodBodyReader.CreateCilBody(AssemblyWriter.moduleDef, arg1, null, true_call_MethodDef.Parameters, 1, true_call_MethodDef.Body.MaxStack, (uint)(arg1.Length), true_call_MethodDef.Body.LocalVarSigTok, GenericParamContext.Create(true_call_MethodDef));

                     true_call_MethodDef.FreeMethodBody();

                     true_call_MethodDef.Body = methodBody;

                     Console.WriteLine(true_call_MethodDef.Name);

                 }

             }

 }

在解密出第一层混淆,很快又发现了第二层混淆, 通过方法体的token算出hash,然后通过hash索引PE文件中区段数据,经过RC4解密解密出方法体。
图片描述
图片描述
第二层混淆被保护的方法体的名称都是flared打头的:
图片描述
接下来编写程序自动化找到这些函数,并调用RC4解密进行修复,代码如下所示:

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private static void flareon_decrypt(IList<TypeDef> typeDefs)

{

    foreach (var typeDef in typeDefs)

        foreach (var methodDef in typeDef.Methods)

            if (methodDef.Module.Name == Assembly.ManifestModule.ScopeName  &&

                  methodDef.ToString().Contains("flared"))

            {

                Console.WriteLine(methodDef.Name);

                var token = methodDef.MDToken.ToInt32();

                var method = Assembly.Modules.FirstOrDefault()?.ResolveMethod(token);

                var ILcode = method.GetMethodBody().GetILAsByteArray();

                var hash_text = flare.flared_66(Assembly.Modules.FirstOrDefault(), token);

                byte[] sec_data = GetSectionData(hash_text);

                byte[] decrypted_IL_code = flare.rc4(new byte[] { 18, 120, 171, 223 }, sec_data);

                var dm = flare.flared_67(Assembly.Modules.FirstOrDefault(), decrypted_IL_code, token);

                Console.WriteLine(sec_data.Length);

                var methodBody = MethodBodyReader.CreateCilBody(AssemblyWriter.moduleDef, decrypted_IL_code, null, methodDef.Parameters, 1, methodDef.Body.MaxStack, (uint)(decrypted_IL_code.Length), methodDef.Body.LocalVarSigTok, GenericParamContext.Create(methodDef));

                if(methodDef.Body.HasExceptionHandlers)

                {

                    Console.WriteLine(methodDef.Name+": " +methodDef.Body.ExceptionHandlers.Count);

                }

                methodDef.FreeMethodBody();

                methodDef.Body = methodBody;

            }

}

在运行程序后,使用wireshark观察其网络活动,一开始我就注意到dns活动,猜测该后门和C&C交互使用DNS隧道进行通信:
图片描述
编写一个DNS server模拟C&C的响应包并对exe进行调试:

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from dnslib import *

from dnslib.server import *

import sys

import time

class TestResolver:

    def __init__(self):

        self.data=[]

        op=[2, 10, 8, 19, 11, 1, 15, 13, 22, 16, 5, 12, 21, 3, 18, 17, 20, 14, 9, 7, 4]

        for i in op:

            op_str=str(i)

            payload_len=len(op_str)

            s=['43']

            for k in range(payload_len):

                s.append(str(ord(op_str[k])))

            s=s+(4-len(s))*["0"]

            pl='.'.join(s)

            self.data+=(['192.0.0.%d'%(payload_len+1)]+[pl])

        self.data=100*self.data

        print(self.data)

        self.pos=0

    def resolve(self,request,handler):

        reply = request.reply()

        qname = request.q.qname

        qtype = request.q.qtype

        if "flare-on.com" in str(qname) and QTYPE[qtype]=='A':

            answer = RR(rname=qname,ttl=60, rdata=A(self.data[self.pos]))

            self.pos+=1

            reply.add_answer(answer)

            return reply

        reply.header.rcode = getattr(RCODE,'NXDOMAIN')

        return reply

def main():

    resolver = TestResolver()

    logger = DNSLogger(prefix=False)

    dns_server = DNSServer(resolver,port=53, address='0.0.0.0', logger=logger)

    dns_server.start_thread()

    try:

        while True:

            time.sleep(600)

            sys.stderr.flush()

            sys.stdout.flush()

    except KeyboardInterrupt:

        sys.exit(0)

if __name__ == '__main__':

    main()

程序中处理数据包的地方如下所示,根据不同的功能码执行不同的cmd:
图片描述
通过动态调试,分析清楚了协议响应包的格式,
[agent_id]+[payload size]+[opcode]+[pad]

前面分析了那么多,那么flag究竟在哪呢?Rc4解密函数被调用了2次,一次用于解密方法体,另一次用于解密flag:
图片描述
RC4密钥是在处理数据包的同时,不断对append的数据,最后得到哈希值作为key:
图片描述
只有这些操作全部调用完成,才会触发解密逻辑:
图片描述
加密的数据和方法体一样,也是在区段数据里面,知道这些,就可以直接编写脚本解密出flag了,脚本如下所示:

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import hashlib

from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4

def to_ps(c):

    return "powershell -exec bypass -enc \"" + c + "\""

op_str=[

(19,"146","JChwaW5nIC1uIDEgMTAuNjUuNDUuMyB8IGZpbmRzdHIgL2kgdHRsKSAtZXEgJG51bGw7JChwaW5nIC1uIDEgMTAuNjUuNC41MiB8IGZpbmRzdHIgL2kgdHRsKSAtZXEgJG51bGw7JChwaW5nIC1uIDEgMTAuNjUuMzEuMTU1IHwgZmluZHN0ciAvaSB0dGwpIC1lcSAkbnVsbDskKHBpbmcgLW4gMSBmbGFyZS1vbi5jb20gfCBmaW5kc3RyIC9pIHR0bCkgLWVxICRudWxs"),

(18,"939","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"),

(16,"e87","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"),

(15,"197","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"),

(14,"3a7","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"),

(10,"f38","hostname"),

(17,"2e4","JAAoAHAAaQBuAGcAIAAtAG4AIAAxACAAMQAwAC4ANgA1AC4ANAA1AC4AMQA4ACAAfAAgAGYAaQBuAGQAcwB0AHIAIAAvAGkAIAB0AHQAbAApACAALQBlAHEAIAAkAG4AdQBsAGwAOwAkACgAcABpAG4AZwAgAC0AbgAgADEAIAAxADAALgA2ADUALgAyADgALgA0ADEAIAB8ACAAZgBpAG4AZABzAHQAcgAgAC8AaQAgAHQAdABsACkAIAAtAGUAcQAgACQAbgB1AGwAbAA7ACQAKABwAGkAbgBnACAALQBuACAAMQAgADEAMAAuADYANQAuADMANgAuADEAMwAgAHwAIABmAGkAbgBkAHMAdAByACAALwBpACAAdAB0AGwAKQAgAC0AZQBxACAAJABuAHUAbABsADsAJAAoAHAAaQBuAGcAIAAtAG4AIAAxACAAMQAwAC4ANgA1AC4ANQAxAC4AMQAwACAAfAAgAGYAaQBuAGQAcwB0AHIAIAAvAGkAIAB0AHQAbAApACAALQBlAHEAIAAkAG4AdQBsAGwA"),

(13,"e38","bnNsb29rdXAgZmxhcmUtb24uY29tIHwgZmluZHN0ciAvaSBBZGRyZXNzO25zbG9va3VwIHdlYm1haWwuZmxhcmUtb24uY29tIHwgZmluZHN0ciAvaSBBZGRyZXNz"),

(12,"570","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"),

(11,"818","RwBlAHQALQBOAGUAdABUAEMAUABDAG8AbgBuAGUAYwB0AGkAbwBuACAAfAAgAFcAaABlAHIAZQAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAewAkAF8ALgBTAHQAYQB0AGUAIAAtAGUAcQAgACIARQBzAHQAYQBiAGwAaQBzAGgAZQBkACIAfQAgAHwAIABTAGUAbABlAGMAdAAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAIgBMAG8AYwBhAGwAQQBkAGQAcgBlAHMAcwAiACwAIAAiAEwAbwBjAGEAbABQAG8AcgB0ACIALAAgACIAUgBlAG0AbwB0AGUAQQBkAGQAcgBlAHMAcwAiACwAIAAiAFIAZQBtAG8AdABlAFAAbwByAHQAIgA="),

(4, "ea5","WwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEUAbgB2AGkAcgBvAG4AbQBlAG4AdABdADoAOgBPAFMAVgBlAHIAcwBpAG8AbgAuAFYAZQByAHMAaQBvAG4AUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcA"),

(5, "bfb","net user"),

(3, "113","whoami"),

(1, "c2e","RwBlAHQALQBOAGUAdABJAFAAQQBkAGQAcgBlAHMAcwAgAC0AQQBkAGQAcgBlAHMAcwBGAGEAbQBpAGwAeQAgAEkAUAB2ADQAIAB8ACAAUwBlAGwAZQBjAHQALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAEkAUABBAGQAZAByAGUAcwBzAA=="),

(7, "b","RwBlAHQALQBDAGgAaQBsAGQASQB0AGUAbQAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACIAQwA6AFwAUAByAG8AZwByAGEAbQAgAEYAaQBsAGUAcwAiACAAfAAgAFMAZQBsAGUAYwB0AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGEAbQBlAA=="),

(8,"2b7","RwBlAHQALQBDAGgAaQBsAGQASQB0AGUAbQAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACcAQwA6AFwAUAByAG8AZwByAGEAbQAgAEYAaQBsAGUAcwAgACgAeAA4ADYAKQAnACAAfAAgAFMAZQBsAGUAYwB0AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGEAbQBlAA=="),

(9,"9b2","RwBlAHQALQBDAGgAaQBsAGQASQB0AGUAbQAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACcAQwA6ACcAIAB8ACAAUwBlAGwAZQBjAHQALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAE4AYQBtAGUA"),

(2,"d7d","RwBlAHQALQBOAGUAdABOAGUAaQBnAGgAYgBvAHIAIAAtAEEAZABkAHIAZQBzAHMARgBhAG0AaQBsAHkAIABJAFAAdgA0ACAAfAAgAFMAZQBsAGUAYwB0AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAiAEkAUABBAEQARAByAGUAcwBzACIA"),

(22,"709","systeminfo | findstr /i \"Domain\""),

(20,"3c9974","RwBlAHQALQBOAGUAdABJAFAAQwBvAG4AZgBpAGcAdQByAGEAdABpAG8AbgAgAHwAIABGAG8AcgBlAGEAYwBoACAASQBQAHYANABEAGUAZgBhAHUAbAB0AEcAYQB0AGUAdwBhAHkAIAB8ACAAUwBlAGwAZQBjAHQALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAE4AZQB4AHQASABvAHAA"),

(21,"8e6","RwBlAHQALQBEAG4AcwBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdABTAGUAcgB2AGUAcgBBAGQAZAByAGUAcwBzACAALQBBAGQAZAByAGUAcwBzAEYAYQBtAGkAbAB5ACAASQBQAHYANAAgAHwAIABTAGUAbABlAGMAdAAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAAUwBFAFIAVgBFAFIAQQBkAGQAcgBlAHMAcwBlAHMA")]

def get_info(key):

    no_ps=[10,5,3,22]

    for i in op_str:

        num=i[0]

        if num==key:

            s=i[2]

            if num not in no_ps:

                s=to_ps(s)

            return (num,i[1],s)

FLARE15_c = [250,242,240,235,243,249,247,245,238,232,253,244,237,251,234,233,236,246,241,255,252]

sh=''

stack='System.Object InvokeMethod(System.Object, System.Object[], System.Signature, Boolean)System.Object Invoke(System.Object, System.Reflection.BindingFlags, System.Reflection.Binder, System.Object[], System.Globalization.CultureInfo)'

key_str=''

d=[]

for i in FLARE15_c:

    op=i^ 248

    print(op)

    d.append(op)

    info=get_info(op)

    sh+=info[1]

    if op!=4:

        key_str+=(stack+info[2])

print(sh[::-1][0:8])

print(d)

hx = hashlib.sha256(key_str.encode('utf8')).digest()

cipher = ARC4.new(hx)

with open('enc_data.bin', 'rb') as fp:

    enc_data = fp.read()

dec_data = cipher.decrypt(enc_data)

with open('dec_data.bin', 'wb') as fp:

    fp.write(dec_data)


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