Sandworm is a highly sophisticated Russian adversary, active since at least 2009, that has been attributed to Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) for Special Technologies (GTsST) military Unit 74455.
Sandworm is characterized by the use of malware families specifically designed to compromise Industrial Control System (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems found in entities located in the Energy, Government, and Media sectors.
Its long-standing center focus has been Ukraine, where it has carried out a large number of disruptive and destructive operations, mainly against the Energy and Telecommunication sectors, through the use of multiple wipers during the last decade.
In addition, it sustains worldwide espionage and sabotage operations demonstrating the Russian military’s far-reaching ambitions and interests in other regions.
Sandworm is believed to be associated with the Russian adversary known as APT28, which is attributed to Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) military Unit 26165, which was previously emulated by AttackIQ in September 2022.
AttackIQ has released a new assessment template that brings together the post-compromise Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) exhibited by Sandworm during its latest activities to help customers validate their security controls and their ability to defend against this disruptive and destructive threat.
Validating your security program performance against these behaviors is vital in reducing risk. By using this new assessment template in the AttackIQ Security Optimization Platform, security teams will be able to:
Since its appearance in 2009, Sandworm has conducted a large number of espionage, sabotage, and destruction operations against multiple targets around the world.
Beginning in 2014, it has conducted multiple sabotage attacks against Ukraine’s energy sector through the use of specialized malware that primarily targeted Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
In 2017, Sandworm was responsible for the mass distribution of the NotPetya ransomware, which affected multiple entities and organizations around the world causing widespread disruption and financial losses.
Several of these activities were supported by the Russian adversary known as APT28, which has been attributed to Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) military Unit 26165.
This assessment template emulates all those Post-Compromise Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) exhibited by Sandworm during its most recent activities.
Consists of techniques that result in adversary-controlled code running on a local or remote system. Techniques that run malicious code are often paired with techniques from all other tactics to achieve broader goals, such as exploring a network or stealing data.
System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 (T1218.011): RunDll32
is a native system utility that can be used to execute DLL files and call a specific export inside the file. This scenario executes RunDll32
with an AttackIQ DLL and calls an export to mimic previously reported malicious activity.
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic (T1059.005): This scenario will attempt to execute a Visual Basic Script (VBS) via cscript.exe
.
Techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access.
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005): This scenario creates a new scheduled task using the schtasks
utility with the name qAWZe
that was observed being used by Sandworm.
Consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection throughout their compromise. Techniques used for defense evasion include uninstalling/disabling security software or obfuscating/encrypting data and scripts.
Masquerading (T1036): This scenario will attempt to modify a file type extension to an alternate file extension once it has landed on the target asset using the move
utility.
Techniques that adversaries use to discover information related to the compromised environment.
System Network Connections Discovery (T1049): The native Windows command line tool netstat
is used to collect active connections and any listening services running on the host.
System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016): The network configuration of the asset is collected using standard Windows utilities like ipconfig
, arp
, route
, and nltest
.
File and Directory Discovery (T1083): This scenario uses the native dir
command to find files of interest and output to a temporary file.
Techniques used by adversaries to harvest credentials available on the compromised system.
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001): Uses rundll32.exe
with comsvcs.dll
to call the MiniDump
export that will dump the LSASS
process memory to disk. This process contains a variety of credential materials and can passed to additional dumping tools to extract credentials.
Techniques that adversaries may use to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network.
Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105): This scenario downloads to memory and saves to disk in two separate scenarios to test network and endpoint controls and their ability to prevent the delivery of known malicious samples.
Consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt availability or compromise integrity by manipulating business and operational processes.
Inhibit System Recovery (T1490): This scenario executes the vssadmin.exe
utility to delete a recent Volume Shadow Copy created by the assessment template.
In addition to the released assessment template, AttackIQ recommends the following scenario to extend the emulation of the capabilities exhibited by Sandworm.
Dump Active Directory Database using ntdsutil.exe: This scenario will attempt to execute the ntdsutil.exe
utility to dump the NTDS.dit
file along with the SYSTEM and SECURITY registry hives.
Given the vast number of techniques used by these adversaries, it can be difficult to know which to prioritize for prevention and detection assessment. AttackIQ recommends first focusing on the following techniques emulated in our scenarios before moving on to the remaining techniques.
Adversaries may use DLL files for many of their malware payloads and leverage a native Windows utility to execute them. The primary native method for executing these files is to call the RunDll32
tool and pass along the path and export function to be executed.
While this tool is commonly used by legitimate applications, there are behaviors related to their execution that can stand out in your process logs. Searching for files that are being executed from temporary directories, that don’t have the standard .dll file extension, or call strange looking export names can stand out from regular user behavior.
Process Name == (rundll32.exe)
Command Line CONTAINS (‘TEMP’ OR ‘.png’ OR ‘Roaming’ OR ‘%APPDATA%’)
Current Directory CONTAINS (‘D:\’ OR ‘E:\’)
MITRE ATT&CK recommends the following mitigation recommendation:
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly from the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel.
With an EDR or SIEM Platform, you can detect the following commands being issued to schedule a malicious task.
Process Name = (“cmd.exe” OR “Powershell.exe”)
Command Line CONTAINS (“schtasks” AND “/CREATE” AND (“cmd” OR “powershell”)
MITRE ATT&CK has the following mitigation recommendations for Scheduled Task
Adversaries may attempt to extract user and credential information from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process.
Search for executions of comsvcs that attempt to access the LSASS process.
Process Name == (comsvcs)
Command Line CONTAINS (‘lsass’)
MITRE ATT&CK recommends the following mitigation recommendations:
In summary, this assessment template will evaluate security and incident response processes and support the improvement of your security control posture against this disruptive and destructive threat. With data generated from continuous testing and use of this assessment template, you can focus your teams on achieving key security outcomes, adjust your security controls, and work to elevate your total security program effectiveness against a well-known and dangerous threat.
AttackIQ stands at the ready to help security teams implement this assessment template and other aspects of the AttackIQ Security Optimization Platform, including through our fully managed service, AttackIQ Ready!, and our co-managed security service, AttackIQ Enterprise.