2024-6-25 23:0:0 Author: feeds.fortinet.com(查看原文) 阅读量:84 收藏
Affected Platforms: Linux Distributions
Impacted Users: Any organization
Impact: Remote attackers gain control of the vulnerable systems
Severity Level: High
Cybersecurity threats are increasingly leveraging cloud services to store, distribute, and establish command and control (C2) servers, such as VCRUMS stored on AWS or SYK Crypter distributed via DriveHQ. This shift in strategy presents significant challenges for detection and prevention, as cloud services provide scalability, anonymity, and resilience that traditional hosting methods lack.
Over the past month, FortiGuard Labs has been monitoring botnets that have adopted this strategy, abusing cloud services to enhance their malicious capabilities. These botnets, such as UNSTABLE and Condi, have been observed leveraging cloud storage and computing services operators to distribute malware payloads and updates to a broad range of devices. Using cloud servers for C2 operations ensures persistent communication with compromised devices, making it harder for defenders to disrupt an attack. We have also observed a threat actor exploiting multiple vulnerabilities to target JAWS webservers, Dasan GPON home routers, Huawei HG532 routers, TP-Link Archer AX21, and Ivanti Connect Secure to amplify their attacks.
In this article, we will detail this threat actor's initial attack method and further explore the botnets being used.
UNSTABLE Botnet
Initial access by the UNSTABLE Botnet targets the JAWS Webserver RCE vulnerability, CVE-2016-20016, and retrieves the downloader script “jaws” from 45[.]128[.]232[.]15.
Figure 3: Downloader script "jaws"
It includes multiple binary files for 13 architectures executed using the parameter “jaws.exploit.” The UNSTABLE Botnet is a Mirai variant that uses XOR to encode its configuration. It has three main modules: exploitation, scanner, and DDoS attack. The exploitation module targets three vulnerabilities: CVE-2016-20016, CVE-2018-10561/10562, and CVE-2017-17215.
Figure 4: Exploitation module
The scanner module includes a hard-coded list of usernames and passwords that it uses for brute-force scanning of other endpoints in the network.
root |
Zte521 |
swsbzkgn |
taZz@23495859 |
grouter |
juantech |
tsgoingon |
telnet |
pass |
solokey |
oelinux123 |
password |
admin |
tl789 |
svgodie |
default |
GM8182 |
t0talc0ntr0l4! |
user |
hunt5759 |
zhongxing |
guest |
telecomadmin |
zlxx. |
telnetadmin |
twe8ehome |
zsun1188 |
1111 |
h3c |
xmhdipc |
12345 |
nmgx_wapia |
klv123 |
123456 |
private |
hi3518 |
54321 |
abc123 |
7ujMko0vizxv |
88888888 |
ROOT500 |
7ujMko0admin |
20080826 |
ahetzip8 |
dreambox |
666666 |
anko |
system |
888888 |
ascend |
iwkb |
1001chin |
blender |
realtek |
xc3511 |
cat1029 |
00000000 |
vizxv |
changeme |
12341234 |
5up |
iDirect |
huigu309 |
jvbzd |
nflection |
win1dows |
hg2x0 |
ipcam_rt5350 |
antslq |
Figure 5: Scanner module and hard-coded username/password
The DDoS attack module is a typical list that covers several protocols. The UNSTABLE botnet contains nine methods: attack_tcp_ack, attack_tcp_syn, attack_tcp_legit, attack_tcp_sack2, attack_udp_plain, attack_udp_vse, attack_udp_thread, attack_gre_ip, and attack_method_nudp. The botnets can choose the appropriate method based on commands from its C2 server.
Condi DDoS Botnet
FortiGuard Labs previously disclosed the Condi DDoS botnet, which continues to exploit CVE-2023-1389 to gain control of devices and execute its malicious activities. The binary file is hosted on “45[.]128[.]232[.]90” for distribution.
Once a device is infected, the malware kills off the competition and specific processes. It then sets up a connection to a central Command and Control (C2) server, “trembolone[.]zapto[.]org.”
Figure 6: Checking list for terminating process
Figure 7: Get the updated version of Condi Botnet
UDP Flooder and Process Checker
FortiGuard Labs noticed the incident as the payload “ping -c 20 209.141.35.56,” which seemed unusual within such an attack. Since the IP address is neither the attack source nor the destination intranet, we suppose these two IP addresses, 45[.]128[.]232[.]229 and 209[.]141[.]35[.]56, might be controlled by the attacker simultaneously and one of them is a command and control (C2) server.
The attack source IP address, “45[.]128[.]232[.]229,” has four files named “msgbox.exe,” “udp,” “udparm,” and “udpmips,” respectively. These are DoS tools for different Linux architectures, except “msgbox.exe,” which pops up a message box with the string “RAT.”
The following analysis examines the “udp” file.
The tool has an unmistakable usage message, “Usage: %s <IP> <SECONDS> [PORT],” while executing without any arguments.
Figure 9: Execution tool without arguments
When executing with the necessary “IP” and “SECONDS” arguments, the tool triggers a UDP flooding DoS attack using system-generated random characters.
Figure 10: Execution tool with arguments
Figure 11: UDP flooding traffic
The IP address “209[.]141[.]35[.]56” pinged by the compromised device is exploited by the attack source IP address “45[.]128[.]232[.]229” using the CVE-2023-1389 vulnerability. It was first met with a page that the FBI has seized due to its use as a DDoS service (Figure 12). However, FortiGuard Labs found the IP address also has another route, “hxxp://209[.]141[.]35[.]56/getters/,” which contains 19 malware variants for different Linux architectures. (see Figure 13)
Figure 12: Website seized page
aarch64 |
microblazebe |
aarch64be |
microblazeel |
arcle-750d |
mips |
arcle-hs38 |
mipsel |
armv4l |
nios2 |
armv5l |
openrisc |
armv6l |
powerpc |
armv7l |
riscv64 |
i586 |
sh4 |
m68k |
sparc |
m68k-68xxx |
x86_64-core-i7 |
m68k-coldfire |
x86-core2 |
m68k-coldfire.gdb |
x86-i686 |
xtensa-lx60 |
Figure 13: The malware for different Linux architectures
We focus on analyzing the file for architecture “x86-i686.” The malware creates a socket and checks whether the C2 server is valid. If not, it terminates the program. If the server is confirmed reachable, the malware sets up a connection with C2 server “45[.]128[.]232[.]229,” which is the exploit CVE-2023-1389 source IP address, executes the “ps” command, and gathers process-related output information.
Figure 14: Set C2 server IP address
The malware executes the command “ps -eo pid,comm --no-headers” through “/bin/bash” to get all process PIDs (Process IDs) and command names running without a header line.
Figure 15: Executes command
It then leverages the obtained PIDs (Process IDs) to further check the commands of those executing processes using “/proc/<PID>/comm.”
Figure 16: Read process command
Afterward, the malware sends related information to the C2 server.
Figure 17: Sending information to the C2 server
According to our analysis, the attackers seem to have a cloud command and control (C2) server (45[.]128[.]232[.]229) and a network-attached malware storage (209[.]141[.]35[.]56). The attacker first checks to see if the leveraged device can reach the network-attached malware storage to download malware and execute the following attack stages.
Skibidi
This malware, which we named “Skibidi,” was spread by the attacker using two different vulnerabilities simultaneously. One is CVE-2023-1389 in TP-Link Archer AX21, which botnets have continuously exploited since it was launched, as detailed in the report produced by FortiGuard Lab. The other is CVE-2024-21887 in Ivanti Connect Secure, which caused a sensation in April 2024.
Figure 18: Attack traffic through Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2024-21887)
Figure 19: Attack traffic through TP-Link Archer AX21 (CVE-2023-1389)
Attackers first download the “Skibidi” malware with a downloader script. It downloads and executes each malware to determine the proper Linux architecture attack.
Figure 20: Downloader script
arm4 |
mips |
arm5 |
mipsel |
arm6 |
ppc |
arm7 |
sh4 |
x86_64 |
Figure 21: The malware targets Linux architectures
The following analysis is based on the malware “skibidi.x86_64.” While executing the malware, it displays the string “youre not skibidi enough.”
Figure 22: Executes the malware
It then calls the Linux function “ptrace” to handle the process on the victim host. The malware sends signals like a debugger to the sub-program, the malware itself, to fork another process to evade detection.
Figure 23: Call "ptrace" function
The malware then decodes strings encoded by XOR for the behaviors creating process and popping up execution result string.
Figure 24: XOR encoded strings
It calls the system function “prctl,” which manipulates the calling process by naming it with the XOR-encoded strings “-bash” and “x86_64.”
Figure 25: Process of the malware
Afterward, the malware tries to connect with its C2 server through a socket. Meanwhile, it uses the system call “select” to listen to the events of files the attacker is interested in, such as process events.
Figure 26: Call “select” function
The malware repeats these steps of listening to events and sends the results back to the server.
Conclusion
Cloud services' inherent flexibility and efficiency have unwittingly provided cybercriminals with a new arena for their activities. This shift to cloud-based operations marks a significant evolution in the threat landscape, with malware operators exploiting these platforms' advantages. Organizations must bolster their cloud security defenses as botnets and DDoS tools continue to leverage cloud services. Robust security measures and vigilant monitoring within cloud environments are imperative to combat these sophisticated attacks. Implementing a multi-layered security approach, including regular patching, updates, and network segmentation, is essential to isolate critical assets and mitigate potential breaches.
Fortinet Protections
The malware described in this report is detected and blocked by FortiGuard Antivirus as:
BASH/Mirai.AEH!tr.dldr
ELF/Gafgyt.ST!tr
ELF/Mirai.CDB!tr
ELF/Mirai.CEA!tr
ELF/Mirai.CPD!tr
ELF/Mirai.OX!tr
ELF/Skibidi.CQC!tr
ELF/UDPFlooder.1C8B!tr
ELF/UDPFlooder.1EE7!tr
ELF/UDPFlooder.E063!tr
Linux/Mirai.CPD!tr
Linux/Mirai.REAL!tr
FortiGate, FortiMail, FortiClient, and FortiEDR support the FortiGuard AntiVirus service. The FortiGuard AntiVirus engine is part of each of these solutions. As a result, customers who have these products with up-to-date protections are protected.
The FortiGuard Web Filtering Service blocks the C2 servers and downloads URLs.
FortiGuard Labs provides IPS signatures against attacks exploiting the following vulnerability:
CVE-2016-20016: JAWS.DVR.CCTV.Shell.Unauthenticated.Command.Execution
CVE-2017-17215: Huawei.HG532.Remote.Code.Execution
CVE-2018-10561: Dasan.GPON.Remote.Code.Execution
CVE-2018-10562: Dasan.GPON.Remote.Code.Execution
CVE-2023-1389: TP-Link.Archer.AX21.Unauthenticated.Command.Injection
CVE-2024-21887: Ivanti.Connect.Secure.Policy.Secure.Authentication.Bypass
We also suggest that organizations go through Fortinet’s free NSE training module: NSE 1 – Information Security Awareness. This module is designed to help end users learn how to identify and protect themselves from phishing attacks.
FortiGuard IP Reputation and Anti-Botnet Security Service proactively block these attacks by aggregating malicious source IP data from the Fortinet distributed network of threat sensors, CERTs, MITRE, cooperative competitors, and other global sources that collaborate to provide up-to-date threat intelligence about hostile sources.
If you believe this or any other cybersecurity threat has impacted your organization, please contact our Global FortiGuard Incident Response Team.
IOCs
C2
45[.]128[.]232[.]15
45[.]128[.]232[.]90
45[.]128[.]232[.]229
45[.]128[.]232[.]234
URLs
hxxp://45[.]128[.]232[.]15
hxxp://45[.]128[.]232[.]90
hxxp://45[.]128[.]232[.]229
hxxp://209[.]141[.]35[.]56/getters
hxxp://45[.]128[.]232[.]234
Files
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