美国前CIA高级情报官员建议成立一个全新的开源情报机构：开源局（OSA)，以应对美国情报界对日益增长的开源情报的急迫需求。
作者简介：威廉·乌谢尔（William Usher）特殊竞争力研究项目（SCSP）高级情报总监、前中央情报局高级情报官员。特殊竞争力研究项目（SCSP）是一个两党合作的非营利性项目，其使命是提出建议，加强美国在人工智能（AI）和其他新兴技术重塑国家安全、经济和社会的未来的长期竞争力。希望确保美国从现在起到 2030 年这一塑造未来的关键时期，有能力、有组织地在技术经济竞争中获胜。
编者注：本文根据情报研究中心的要求改编而成，该中心为了小组讨论的目的，要求作者提出建立新的开源情报（OSINT）机构的理由。这些建议并不一定反映特别竞争研究项目或美国政府任何部门的观点。
机器翻译：
2001 年，美国国家情报委员会前主席、中央情报局负责情报工作的副局长约翰-甘农在本刊（《情报研究》）上写道，开源情报（OSINT）已成为 “进行权威分析不可或缺的工具”，但他指出，情报界（IC）面临着 “来自开源和机密收集来源的雪崩”。他接着写道："单靠情报部门自身的力量，根本无法走在技术发展的前沿，而且它也知道这一点。
将近25年后的今天，开源情报（OSINT）在扩大情报界工作范围和影响方面的承诺，以及情报界（IC）在使用开源情报（OSINT）时所面临的关键挑战--数量、速度和真实性--才变得更加明显。以国家安全为重点的公司、非营利组织和学术界形成了一个充满活力的生态系统，通过专注于开源领域的特定要素，开发出了专业的技术和产品。这个生态系统几乎涵盖了美国政府关注的人口贩运等所有主题。美国国防情报局（ODNI）的《2024-2026 开源情报（OSINT）战略》将开源情报（OSINT）定义为完全从公开信息或商业信息中获取的情报，这些信息涉及特定的情报优先事项、需求或缺口。私营部门已经找到了吸收和分析新数据并快速推出产品的工具和战略。
在这一领域，洞察的速度--比别人更快地理解数据--是美国应对数据带来的风险和机遇的必要条件。据预测，到2025年，可用数据将从2020年的 64.2 ZB增加到180ZB 以上。其他许多国家，包括我们的对手，在利用商业可用信息（CAI）和/或公开可用信息（PAI）为自己谋利方面，远没有美国情报界（IC）那么自满。例如，ZG军方与至少五家私营开源情报（OSINT）提供商合作，收集各种相关问题的情报，包括外国军事能力和部署。
情报界（IC）似乎认识到，要想继续为国家安全领导人提供决策优势，以更快的速度、更大的范围和更多的数量，整合来自这个世界的数据和洞察力将越来越有必要。过去十年来，解决情报界（IC）的开源情报（OSINT）问题一直是许多数据电话、会议、学术论文和专栏文章的主题。然而，在进行了如此多的研究之后，一个全面的解决方案仍未付诸实施。
一些高级国家安全官员认为，前进的道路仍在情报部门的现有架构内。国家情报总监办公室最近颁布的 “情报界（IC）开源情报（OSINT）战略 ”似乎支持这一思路。其他人则认为，情报界（IC）应完全退出开源情报（OSINT）业务，理由是政府永远无法与私营部门的速度和资源相提并论，而应将自己定位为这些数据的良好客户。还有人主张采取更大胆、更具变革性的方法。
我们试图解决什么问题？
尽管做出了这些努力，但由于种种原因，情报界（IC）在开源情报（OSINT）方面仍有落后的危险。综合来看，这些障碍是任何新方法都需要解决的开源情报（OSINT）问题，而所提出的解决方案应根据它们如何有效和高效地应对这些挑战来衡量。
商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）的数量正在爆炸性增长，而情报界（IC）却跟不上步伐，无法对其进行合理利用。数据没有被发现，也没有得到充分利用。了解现有数据的情报界（IC）官员相对较少，他们在获取数据时面临着无数的财务、安全和官僚障碍。即使成功获得数据，情报界（IC）官员也往往缺乏数据管理和操作情报系统的技术技能，或无法获得有效利用数据的高级分析工具。
情报界（IC）对其所拥有的数据、数据的价值、数据的保存地点以及数据的使用方式都不甚了解。新的国家情报总监发布的开源情报（OSINT）战略令人钦佩地呼吁关注这些不足之处，但情报界（IC）各机构仍然没有被激励或要求分享他们所获得的商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI），而情报界往往要为访问相同的数据支付数倍的费用。单个数据集的质量和可用性在不断变化；商业供应商时兴时衰；数据集被创建，然后被购买并从流通中删除，或者定价昂贵；学术界创建的数据集通常被严密保管，以便原始创建者在使其更容易获取之前能够充分加以利用；对手正在关闭对其国内数据生态系统的访问，同时试图污染我们的数据集。
虽然情报界（IC）收集开源数据的成本和风险通常较低，但情报界（IC）对开源情报（OSINT）能力的投资却低于其更传统的收集能力和方法。现有的开源情报（OSINT）实体，如中央情报局的开源企业，隶属于现有的官僚结构，阻碍了它们利用资源和施加影响的能力。
因此，即使决策者对情报界（IC）情报洞察力的需求不断增加，情报界（IC）也无法大规模、快速地提供源于开源情报的评估和其他产品。由于情报界（IC）通常依靠其所有来源的分析队伍来筛选能够接触到其最高级客户的评估，而且由于情报界（IC）的大多数分析人员仍然相对较少使用 商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI），因此开源情报（OSINT）衍生的见解往往不能及时地到达关键决策者手中，甚至根本无法到达。此外，情报界（IC）的一小部分专门的开源情报（OSINT）分析人员并没有很好地整合到所有来源的分析团队中。
设立新机构的理由
为了充分解决开源情报（OSINT）问题，并保持情报界（IC）的相关性和决策者的战略优势，美国应在情报界（IC）内设立一个新的第 19 个机构，专门负责这项任务。新成立的开源局（OSA）应是独立于情报界（IC）之外的独立成员；其主要目的是获取、整理、开发、使用和共享用于情报目的的商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）数据源。
至少在初期，它的职能是向其他情报界（IC）成员（并有选择地向外国盟友和合作伙伴、私营部门和公众）提供开源情报（OSINT），供他们分析和使用。正如美国国家侦察局负责建造和运营美国的卫星星座，但依赖于国家地理空间情报局和其他情报界（IC）机构对其收集的数据进行分析一样，开源局（OSA）将重点加快和简化获取商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）的过程，供其他机构使用。
开源局（OSA）雇员将 “生活 ”在非机密领域，大部分时间在非机密工作区和低端非机密系统中度过，使他们能够定期接触私营部门并与之合作。与 In-Q-Tel 一样，开源局（OSA）将有指定的安全空间用于保密工作，并与情报界的其他部分进行安全通信，以征集情报需求、传播信息，并就包括目标研究和收集规划在内的保密项目进行合作。
开源局（OSA）将利用情报界（IC）的授权成立，并将成为情报界（IC）负责开源情报（OSINT）的 “职能管理者”，就像国家安全局负责信号情报（SIGINT）的职能管理和中央情报局（CIA）负责人力情报（HUMINT） 的职能管理一样，开源局（OSA）的主任将向国家情报总监报告，并接受 美国众议院情报委员会（HPSCI ）和参议院情报委员会 （SSCI）的国会监督，拥有自己的预算拨款。
在隐私和安全合规性、质量、整个情报界（IC）的可用性和定价方面，开源局（OSA）将应用和执行商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）数据源数据而制定标准。开源局（OSA）将作为承包商和中间人，将数据供应商与情报界（IC）机构连接起来，由情报界（IC）机构存储和分析数据。
开源局（OSA）将确保所获取的商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）数据集的一致性、互操作性、生命周期监测和核算，并将对国家信息基础设施优先事项和情报界（IC）的要求和任务做出响应。它将为商业供应商提供一个可靠的一站式进入点，向情报界（IC）销售其数据和分析工具，使私营部门与情报界（IC）的合作更加容易和高效。由于开源局（OSA）将兼顾情报界（IC）的资产和需求，因此它应能发挥其市场力量，降低成本，提高互操作性，并获得商业开发的解决方案。
开源情报技术
开源局（OSA）的第二项主要任务是培养、开发和传授开源情报（OSINT）技术，以提高整个情报界（IC）的敏锐度。开源局（OSA）拥有情报界（IC）商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）信息领域的专家，包括商业市场、供应商、数据集以及商业销售的分析和平台。开源局（OSA）将成为情报界（IC）全源分析人员和收集人员的数据合作伙伴，帮助他们纳入开源情报（OSINT）以满足任务要求。
开源局（OSA）的能力将提供给情报界（IC）的所有其他18个机构，包括充当情报界（IC）可信赖的商业工具和平台的评估者，以及商业数据供应商及其能力的反情报（CI）和供应链审查的协调中心。
开源局（OSA）还可以作为情报界（IC）的分支机构，发现、评估和宣传私营部门（商业供应商、学术界或智库专家）对美国国家安全优先事项的开源评估。它可以定期出版最佳商业开源情报（OSINT）技术和工具（包括数据管理、可视化、增强和虚拟现实以及讲故事）的汇编，以教育其他情报界（IC）机构并促进其使用。
随着其逐渐成熟，开源局（OSA）应发展内部分析能力，重点关注最适合非保密开源的主题，如政治和外交政策、跨国问题、经济趋势或技术评估。在总统、国防情报局和国防情报局的指导下，开源局（OSA）可以进一步开发基于云的非机密在线协作空间，以便与私营部门、国家和地方当局、外国情报联络部门以及公众开展更广泛的情报界（IC）分析外联活动。
虽然其他解决开源情报（OSINT）问题的方案各有千秋，但建立一个新的专门机构是最好的、可实现的和可持续的成功之路。由于新机构将不进行评估，这种方法将避免产生重复和浪费的分析能力，并最大限度地减少官僚内斗的可能性，使分析人员能够接触到政策制定者，同时监督局及其情报界（IC）合作伙伴决定其分析能力的最佳部署。
保持所有来源的分析师对向决策者提供见解的权限，也能使与高级情报客户的情报 “对话 ”保持重点和活力。根据笔者的经验，客户很少要求进行非保密评估，而是希望利用现有的任何来源进行最佳分析。开发任务将在整个情报界（IC）中提供，以加强所有资源分析单位的工作。
正如国家侦察局影响商业空间开发的方向，以确保美国的国家安全需求得到优先考虑和解决一样，开源局（OSA）对开源情报（OSINT）的影响也是如此。作为情报界（IC）的开源情报（OSINT）职能管理者，开源局（OSA）将有权力和预算来确定、获取和推广情报界（IC）应获取的商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）源。在开源局（OSA）的领导下，组织官方情报信息工作将赋予情报界（IC）更大的市场力量，以提供相关的 商业可用信息（CAI）并刺激私营部门的创新。从长远来看，在内部进行这项工作将变得更加省钱和高效。
随着经验的积累和价值的证明，开源局（OSA）将被定位为推动开源情报（OSINT） 资源和技术向前发展，扩大和加速开源情报（OSINT）缩小情报差距和提供战略洞察力的能力，从而更有效地利用保密收集能力，并将其保留给只有它们才能渗透的真正困难的目标。对于情报界（IC）来说，开源局（OSA）将是一个理想的沙盒，可以试验大型语言模型、其他形式的生成式人工智能和机器学习工具，并将其应用于以新的创新方式提供情报见解。
监督
白宫需要请求、国会需要授权和拨款来建立一个新的机构。加快这一进程的一个方法是确定监督局中某些不需要安全审查或基本机密级别审查的职位。要想取得全面成功，开源局（OSA）需要在应用操作情报系统方面获得必要的授权，并在情报中心享有足够的地位，以便向客户提供深入的见解。
正如第 12333 号行政命令、《外国情报监视法》和第 42 号国家安全指令授权美国国家安全局收集外国信号情报和保护国家安全系统一样，监督局也需要强有力的行政权力来批准、修改或禁止在整个情报中心获取 商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）。需要激励各机构（并反过来激励其官员）更好地利用商业可用信息（CAI）和公开可用信息（PAI）数据，并采用开源局（OSA）建议的方法。
随着其分析能力的增长，开源局（OSA）将需要在线传播能力，以及总统分析支持人员的代表，以便为《总统每日简报》（PDB）的加工提供信息，并在国家情报总监编制国家情报评估中作出贡献。
开源局（OSA）将需要授权、分层和独立的监督机制，以确保遵守美国法律和既定的情报隐私保护惯例。与其他情报界（IC）构一样，开源局（OSA）的监察长应由参议院确认的总统任命人员担任；监察长应定期向白宫和国会报告开源局（OSA）的表现和对个人信息（PII）合规性的处理情况。最后，开源局（OSA）的公民自由、隐私和透明度办公室应定期进行独立审查。
原文：
In 2001, John Gannon—formerchair of the National IntelligenceCouncil and deputy director forintelligence at CIA—wrote in thisjournal that open-source intelligence (OSINT) had become“indispensable to the production ofauthoritative analysis,” yet he notedthat the Intelligence Community(IC) faced “an avalanche from bothopen-source and classified collection sources.” He went on to writethat, “By itself, the IC simply cannot stay ahead of the technologicalcurve and it knows it.”
Almost a quarter of a centurylater, the promise of OSINT toexpand the scope and impact of ICwork, as well as the critical challenge the IC faces when workingwith OSINT—volume, velocity,and veracity—have only becomestarker. A dynamic ecosystem ofnational security-focused companies, non-profits, and academiahave developed specialized expertise and products by focusingon specific elements of the opensource space. This ecosystem coversnearly every topic of US government concern: human traffickinga. The ODNI’s IC OSINT Strategy 2024–2026 defines OSINT as intelligence derived exclusively from publicly available information or commercially available information that addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps.networks, China’s attempts tosteal intellectual property from USfirms, trends in global public opinion, and nuclear proliferation, justto name a few. The private sectorhas found tools and strategies toabsorb and analyze new data andto push out products at speed.
In this arena, speed to insight—understanding the data faster thanothers do—is necessary for theUnited States to respond first tothe risks and opportunities thedata present. By 2025, it is projected that there will be more than180 zettabytes of data available,up from 64.2 zettabytes in 2020.Many other countries, includingour adversaries, are much less complacent than the IC in leveragingcommercially available information(CAI) and/or publicly availableinformation (PAI) for their advantage. For example, China’s People’sLiberation Army partners with atleast five private OSINT providersto collect intelligence on a variety of relevant issues, includingforeign military capabilities anddeployments.
The IC appears to recognizethat integrating data and insightsfrom this world at speed, scope,and volume will be increasinglynecessary to continue to offer decision advantage to national securityleaders. Solving the IC’s OSINTproblem has been the subject ofmany data calls, conferences, academic papers, and op-eds over thepast decade. After so many studies,however, an all-encompassing solution has not yet been implemented.
Some senior national securityofficials believe the way forwardremains within the community’scurrent construct. The IC OSINTstrategy recently promulgatedby the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence would appearto support this line of thinking.aOthers argue that the IC shouldget out of the OSINT businessaltogether, on the theory that thegovernment can never match thespeed and resources of the privatesector and instead should positionitself as a good customer of thisdata. Still others urge a bolder,more transformative approach.
What are We Trying to Solve?
Despite these efforts, the ICis in danger of falling behind onOSINT for a variety of reasons.Taken together, these obstaclesare the OSINT problem thatany new approach needs to solve,and proposed solutions shouldbe measured by how effectivelyand efficiently they address thesechallenges.
The amount of CAI/PAI is exploding, and the IC is not keeping pace to make proper use of it. Data is going undiscovered and underutilized. Relatively few IC officers know what data exists and they face myriad financial, security, andbureaucratic obstacles to obtainingit. Even if they succeed, IC officersoften lack the data managementand OSINT tradecraft skills oraccess to cutting-edge analytic toolsto effectively utilize the data.
The IC has a poor understanding of the data it holds, how valuable it is, where it is kept, and howit is used. The new DNI OSINTstrategy admirably calls attentionto these shortcomings, but ICagencies are still not incentivizedor required to share the CAI/PAI they have acquired and theCommunity often pays multipletimes for access to the same data.This challenge is compoundedby the extremely dynamic natureof the global data market, whichcontinues to grow exponentially inaggregate but with a great deal ofvolatility. The quality and availability of individual datasets areconstantly shifting; commercialvendors rise and fall; datasets arecreated, then bought and removedfrom circulation, or priced expensively; academic-created datasetsare often closely held so that theoriginal creator can fully exploit itbefore making it more accessible;adversaries are closing off accessto their domestic data ecosystemswhile they actively try to polluteour datasets.
While it is generally lessexpensive and risky for the IC togather open-source data, the ICunder invests in OSINT capabilities in favor of its more traditionalcollection capabilities and methods. Existing OSINT entities, suchas CIA’s Open Source Enterprise,are subordinated within existingbureaucratic structures, impedingtheir ability to harness resourcesand exert influence.
As a consequence, even aspolicymaker demands on the ICfor intelligence insights continueto increase, the IC fails to deliverOSINT-derived assessments andother products at scale and atspeed. Because the IC generallyrelies on its all-source analyticcadre to filter the assessments thatreach its seniormost customers, andbecause most IC analysts remainrelatively poor consumers andusers of CAI/PAI, OSINT-derivedinsights often do not reach key decisionmakers in a timely fashion,if at all. Moreover, the IC’s smallcadre of dedicated OSINT analysts are not well-integrated into allsource analytic teams.
The Case for a New Agency
To fully address the OSINT problem and maintain the IC’s relevanceand strategic edge with decisionmakers, the United States should createa new, 19th agency within the ICdedicated to the task. The new OpenSource Agency (OSA) should be astandalone and independent member of the IC; its principal purposewould be to acquire, curate, develop, employ, and share CAI andPAI data sources for intelligencepurposes.
At least initially, its functionwould be to deliver OSINT toother IC members (and, selectively, to foreign allies and partners, the private sector, and to thepublic) for them to analyze andmake use of. Just as the NationalReconnaissance Office builds andoperates the US constellation ofsatellites but relies on the NationalGeospatial-Intelligence Agencyand other IC agencies to analyzethe data they collect, OSA wouldfocus on accelerating and streamlining the acquisition of PAI/CAIthat other agencies would makeuse of.
OSA employees would “live” inthe unclassified realm, spendingmuch of their time in unclassified workspaces and on low-sideunclassified systems, freeing themup to have regular access to andcollaboration with the private sector. As with In-Q-Tel, OSA wouldhave designated secure spaces forclassified work and secure communications with the rest of the IC tosolicit intelligence requirements,disseminate information, andcollaborate on classified projectsto include targeting studies andcollection planning.
OSA would be establishedusing IC authorities and wouldbecome the IC’s “functional manager” for OSINT in the same waythe NSA director is the functionalmanager for SIGINT and the CIAdirector (DCIA) is the functionalmanager for HUMINT. OSA’sdirector would report to the DNI,and it would be subject to congressional oversight by the HPSCIand SSCI and have its own budgetappropriation.
OSA would apply and enforceODNI-established standards forincorporation of CAI/PAI datawith regards to privacy and securitycompliance, quality, IC-wide availability, and pricing. OSA would actas the contractor and go-betweenconnecting data vendors with ICagencies, which would store andanalyze the take.
OSA would ensure consistency,interoperability, and life-cyclemonitoring and accounting forCAI/PAI datasets that wereacquired, and it would be responsive to NIPF priorities and ICrequirements and tasking. It wouldoffer commercial vendors a reliableone-stop point of entry to sell theirdata and analytic tools to the IC,making it easier and more efficientfor the private sector to partnerwith the IC. Because it would lookacross IC equities and requirements, OSA should be able to exert its market power to drive downcosts and increase interoperabilityand access to commercially-developed solutions.
OSINT Tradecraft
OSA’s second principal missionwould be to cultivate, develop, andteach OSINT tradecraft to elevatethe acumen of the entire IC. OSAwould have the IC’s experts onthe CAI/PAI information domain—including the commercialmarketplace, vendors, datasets, andcommercially sold analytics andplatforms. OSA would become thedata partners to the IC’s cadre ofall-source analysts and collectors,helping them incorporate OSINTto meet mission requirements.
OSA’s capabilities would beavailable to all the other 18 ICagencies and would include acting as the IC’s trusted evaluator ofcommercial tools and platforms,and the focal point for CI andsupply-chain vetting of commercialdata vendors and their capabilities.OSA, for example, could maintainthe IC’s catalog of proven andvetted commercial datasets thatIC agencies could tap into whenmission requirements demand.Eventually, OSA could developAI-driven API platforms to integrate valued datasets and simplifythe process for IC agencies to tapinto them.
It could also act as the IC armfor discovering, evaluating, andadvertising open source-derivedassessments by the private sector(commercial vendors, academics,or think tanks experts) of relevanceto US national security priorities.It could publish a regular compendium of the best commercialOSINT tradecraft and tools(including data management, visualization, augmented and virtualreality, and storytelling) to educateother IC offices and promote theiruse.
As it matures, OSA should develop in-house analytic capabilities,focused on topics that most readilylend themselves to unclassifiedopen sources, such as politics andforeign policy, transnational issues,economic trends, or technologyassessments. At the direction of thepresident, ODNI, and DCIA, theOpen Source Agency could furtherdevelop cloud-based unclassified online collaboration spacesto enable broader IC analyticoutreach with the private sector,state and local authorities, foreignintelligence liaison services, andthe general public.
While other options for solvingthe OSINT problem have theirindividual merits, creating a newdedicated agency offers the best,achievable, and sustainable path forsuccess. It is the one solution thatwould give OSINT greater statureacross the IC and better enableCongress and the White House todirect greater resources toward it.Because the new agency would notproduce assessments, this approachwould avoid creating duplicativeand wasteful analytic capabilities and minimize the chances ofdebilitating bureaucratic infightingfor analytic access to policymakerswhile OSA and its IC partnersdetermine where its analytic capabilities are best deployed.
Maintaining the all-source analytic community’s purview over thedelivery of insights to policymakersalso keeps the intelligence “conversation” with senior intelligencecustomers focused and vibrant. Inthis author’s experience, customersrarely demand unclassified assessments and instead want the bestanalysis using whatever sources areavailable. Development missionswould be made available IC-wideto enhance the work done by allsource analytic units.
Just as the NRO influencedthe direction of commercial spacedevelopment to ensure US nationalsecurity requirements were prioritized and addressed, so wouldOSA for OSINT. As the IC’sOSINT functional manager, OSAwould have the writ and budgetto identify, acquire, and promotewhich CAI and PAI sources theIC should acquire. OrganizingOSINT efforts under OSA wouldgive the IC greater market powerto generate supply of relevant CAIand spur innovation in the privatesector. In the long run, it would becheaper and more efficient to dothis in-house.
As it gains experience andproves its worth, OSA wouldbe positioned to drive OSINTresources and tradecraft forward, enlarging and acceleratingOSINT’s ability to close intelligence gaps and deliver strategicinsight, thereby allowing for moreefficient use of classified collectioncapabilities and reserving themfor the truly hard targets that onlythey can penetrate. OSA wouldbe an ideal sandbox for the IC toexperiment with large-languagemodels, other forms of generativeartificial intelligence, and machinelearning tools, applying them todeliver intelligence insights in newand innovative ways.
Oversight
The White House would needto request, and Congress wouldneed to authorize and appropriatefunds to establish a new agency. Itprobably would take considerable time to hire and onboard staff andidentify suitable physical space.One way to speed up the processwould be to identify certain roleswithin OSA that would not require a security clearance, or a basicsecret-level clearance. To be fullysuccessful, OSA would need to beinvested with requisite authoritiesover the application of OSINTand enjoy sufficient standing in theIC to deliver insight to customers.
Just as Executive Order12333, the Foreign IntelligenceSurveillance Act, and NationalSecurity Directive 42 authorizeNSA to collect foreign signalsintelligence and protect nationalsecurity systems, OSA wouldneed strong executive authorityto approve, modify, or disallowCAI/PAI acquisitions across theIC. Agencies would need to beincentivized (and, in turn, createincentives for their officers) tomake better use of CAI/PAI dataand to adopt OSA’s recommendedtradecraft.
As its analytic capabilities grew,OSA would need an online dissemination capability, along withrepresentation on the President’sAnalytic Support Staff to feedinto the PDB process and at theNational Intelligence Board tocontribute to the production ofnational intelligence estimates.
OSA would need empowered,layered, and independent oversightmechanisms to ensure compliancewith US law and established ICprivacy protection practices. Inline with other IC agencies, OSA’sinspector general should be apresidential appointee confirmedby the Senate; the IG shouldreport regularly to the WhiteHouse and to Congress on OSA’sperformance and handling of PIIcompliance. Finally, the ODNI’sOffice of Civil Liberties, Privacy,and Transparency should conductregular, independent reviews.
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